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**(PRIMITIVE) ACCUMULATION**

**BUILDING THE RUINOUS**

**ANKERZENTRUM**

**RUIN US**

**TUMULT**

**SURVIVING IN THE RUINOUS RUIN**

**PROPER AND  
IMPROPER (RUINS)**

**LEGALLY SPEAKING**

**(IL)LEGALLY SURVIVING**

Introduction

- a. born into borders
- b. given a name
- c. typed into electronic fields

turns the field

Chapter 1

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Of the deep digital wilderness  
are we  
hoards of analog resistance  
sifting through rubble

with our hands.



fig.1

From a landscape sequence -- circulating fields  
that overlap, intersect, and sometimes diverge.



fig.2

Dissuaded from crossing the border,  
we pass the night sleeping upright  
in an open field.

Chapter 2

In which we turn up an orifice and  
extract a tunnel, preparing its  
earthen walls by hand with saliva;  
to bypass the border and enter you.

Chapter 3

The riverbed is broken through from underneath, as is the skin of its current pierced. The mud embankment is crawled out of, and the earth is danced furiously upon.









W ~~E~~BACKWARD S

W B ~~A~~CKWARD S

~~W~~ B ~~A~~CKWARD S


~~E~~W ~~C~~AKWARD S


B ~~W~~C ~~A~~KWARD S D

B ~~A~~W ~~C~~A ~~W~~LASR D

# (PRIMITIVE) ACCUMULATION

BUILDING THE RUINOUS





Die kapitalistische Produktion ist von Anbeginn in ihren Bewegungsformen und -gesetzen auf die gesamte Erde als Schatzkammer der Produktivkräfte berechnet. In seinem Drange nach Aneignung der Produktivkräfte zu Zwecken der Ausbeutung durchstößt das Kapital die ganze Welt, verschafft sich Produktionsmittel aus allen Winkeln der Erde, errafft oder erwirbt sie von allen Kulturstufen und Gesellschaftsformen. Die Frage nach den sachlichen Elementen der Kapitalakkumulation, weit entfernt, durch die sachliche Gestalt des kapitalistisch produzierten Mehrwerts bereits gelöst zu sein, verwandelt sich vielmehr in eine ganz andere Frage: zur produktiven Verwendung des realisierten Mehrwerts ist erforderlich, daß das Kapital fortschreitend immer mehr den gesamten Erdball zur Verfügung hat, um in seinen Produktionsmitteln quantitativ und qualitativ unumschränkte Auswahl zu haben.

Plötzliche Inangriffnahme neuer Rohstoffgebiete in unumschränktem Maße, sowohl um allen eventuellen Wechselfällen und Unterbrechungen in der Zufuhr der Rohstoffe aus alten Quellen wie allen plötzlichen Erweiterungen des gesellschaftlichen Bedarfs gewachsen zu sein, ist eine der unumgänglichsten Vorbedingungen des Akkumulationsprozesses in seiner Elastizität und Sprunghaftigkeit. Als der Sezessionskrieg die Zufuhr der amerikanischen Baumwolle nach England unterbrochen und im Distrikte Lancashire den berühmten ›Baumwollhunger‹ hervorgerufen hatte, entstanden wie durch Zauber in kürzester Zeit neue gewaltige Baumwollplantagen in Ägypten. Hier war es die orientalische Despotie, verbunden mit dem uralten Fronverhältnis, die dem europäischen Kapital das Wirkungsgebiet geschaffen hatte. Nur das Kapital mit seinen techni-

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schen Mitteln vermag solche wunderbaren Umwälzungen in so kurzer Frist hervorzuzaubern. Aber nur auf vorkapitalistischem Boden primitiverer sozialer Verhältnisse vermag es solche Kommandogewalt über sachliche und menschliche Produktivkräfte zu entfalten, die zu jenen Wundern gehören. Ein anderes Beispiel dieser Art ist die enorme Steigerung des Weltverbrauchs an Kautschuk, der gegenwärtig einer regelmäßigen Lieferung von Rohgummi im Werte von einer Milliarde Mark jährlich gleichkommt. Die wirtschaftliche Basis dieser Rohstoffherzeugung sind die vom europäischen Kapital praktizierten primitiven Ausbeutungssysteme in den afrikanischen Kolonien sowie in Amerika, die verschiedene Kombinationen von Sklaverei und Fronverhältnis darstellen.

Rosa Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals. Ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus* (1913), 26. Kapitel: Die Reproduktion des Kapitals und ihr Milieu, quoted from: Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke, Band VI*, Berlin: Vereinigung Internationaler Verlags-Anstalten, 1923, pp. 279-280

Une conférence de Berlin avait pu répartir l'Afrique déchiquetée entre trois ou quatre pavillons.

Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre* (1961), Paris: La Découverte 1985/2004, p. 65

So wenig die kapitalistische Produktion sich auf die Naturschätze und Produktivkräfte der gemäßigten Zone beschränken kann, vielmehr zu ihrer Entfaltung der Verfügungsmöglichkeit über alle Erdstriche und Klimate bedarf, so wenig kann sie mit der Arbeitskraft der weißen Rasse allein auskommen. Das Kapital braucht zur Nutzbarmachung von Erdstrichen, in denen

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die weiße Rasse arbeitsunfähig ist, anderer Rassen, es braucht überhaupt die unumschränkte Verfügungsmöglichkeit über alle Arbeitskräfte des Erdrunds, um mit ihnen alle Produktivkräfte der Erde – soweit dies in den Schranken der Mehrwertproduktion möglich – mobil zu machen. Diese Arbeitskräfte findet es aber meist in festen Banden überkommener vorkapitalistischer Produktionsverhältnisse, aus denen sie erst ›befreit‹ werden müssen, um in die tätige Armee des Kapitals einrolliert zu werden. Der Prozeß der Ausscheidung der Arbeitskräfte aus primitiven sozialen Verhältnissen und ihr Aufsaugen durch das kapitalistische Lohnsystem ist eine der unumgänglichen historischen Grundlagen des Kapitalismus. Die englische Baumwollindustrie als erster echt kapitalistischer Produktionszweig wäre unmöglich nicht bloß ohne die Baumwolle der Südstaaten der nordamerikanischen Union, sondern auch ohne die Millionen Afrikaner, die nach Amerika verpflanzt wurden, um die Arbeitskräfte für die Plantagen zu liefern und nach dem Sezessionskriege als freies Proletariat der kapitalistischen Lohnarbeiterklasse zugewachsen sind. Die Wichtigkeit des Bezuges von erforderlichen Arbeitskräften aus nichtkapitalistischen Gesellschaften wird dem Kapital sehr fühlbar in der Form der sogenannten Arbeiterfrage in den Kolonien. Der Lösung dieser Frage dienen alle möglichen Methoden der ›sanften Gewalt‹, um die anderen sozialen Autoritäten und Produktionsbedingungen untergeordneten Arbeitskräfte von diesen loszulösen und dem Kommando des Kapitals zu unterstellen. Aus diesem Bestreben ergeben sich in den Kolonialländern die seltsamsten Mischformen zwischen modernem Lohnsystem und primitiven Herrschaftsverhältnissen. Diese illustrieren handgreiflich die Tatsache, daß die

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kapitalistische Produktion ohne Arbeitskräfte aus anderen sozialen Formationen nicht auszukommen vermag.

Rosa Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals. Ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus* (1913), 26. Kapitel: Die Reproduktion des Kapitals und ihr Milieu, quoted from: Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Band VI, Berlin: Vereinigung Internationaler Verlags-Anstalten, 1923, pp. 284–285

Aux colonies, l'infrastructure économique est également une superstructure. La cause est conséquence : on est riche parce que blanc, on est blanc parce que riche. C'est pourquoi les analyses marxistes doivent être toujours légèrement distendues chaque fois qu'on aborde le problème colonial.

Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre* (1961), Paris: La Découverte 1985/2004, p. 43

Capital, Marx wrote, comes on the face of the earth dripping blood and dirt from head to toe (1909, Vol. I: 8134) and, indeed, when we look at the beginning of capitalist development, we have the impression of being in an immense concentration camp. In the “New World” we have the subjugation of the aboriginal population to the regimes of the *mita* and *cuatelchil* under which multitudes of people were consumed to bring silver and mercury to the surface in the mines of Huancavelica and Potosi. In Eastern Europe, we have a “second serfdom,” tying to the land a population of farmers who had never previously been enserfed.

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**In Western Europe, we have the Enclosures, the Witch-Hunt, the branding, whipping, and incarceration of vagabonds and beggars in newly constructed work-houses and correction houses, models for the future prison system. On the horizon, we have the rise of the slave trade, while on the seas, ships are already transporting indentured servants and convicts from Europe to America.**

Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch. Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*, New York: Autonomedia, 2004, p. 64

Bei der primitiven Akkumulation, d. h. in den ersten geschichtlichen Anfängen des Kapitalismus in Europa am Ausgang des Mittelalters und bis ins 19. Jahrhundert hinein, bildete das Bauernlegen in England und auf dem Kontinent das großartigste Mittel zur massenhaften Verwandlung der Produktionsmittel und Arbeitskräfte in Kapital. Indes dieselbe Aufgabe wird bis auf den heutigen Tag durch das herrschende Kapital in ganz anders großartigem Maßstab ausgeführt - in der modernen Kolonialpolitik. Es ist eine Illusion, zu hoffen, der Kapitalismus würde sich je nur mit Produktionsmitteln begnügen, die er auf dem Wege des Warenhandels erstehen kann. Die Schwierigkeit für das Kapital besteht in dieser Hinsicht schon darin, daß auf gewaltigen Strecken der exploitierbaren Erdoberfläche die Produktivkräfte sich im Besitz von gesellschaftlichen Formationen befinden, die entweder zum Warenhandel nicht neigen oder aber gerade die wichtigsten Produktionsmittel, auf die es dem Kapital ankommt, überhaupt nicht feilbieten, weil die Eigentumsformen wie die ganze

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soziale Struktur dies von vornherein ausschließen. Dahin gehören vor allem Grund und Boden mit dem ganzen Reichtum an mineralischem Gehalt im Innern sowie mit dem Wiesen-, Wälder- und Wasserbestand an der Oberfläche, ferner Viehherden bei viehzüchtenden primitiven Völkern. Sich hier auf den Prozeß der langsamen auf Jahrhunderte berechneten inneren Zersetzung dieser naturalwirtschaftlichen Gebilde verlassen und ihre Resultate erst abwarten, bis sie zur Entäußerung der wichtigsten Produktionsmittel auf dem Wege des Warenhandels führen, würde für das Kapital soviel bedeuten, als überhaupt auf die Produktivkräfte jener Gebiete verzichten. Daraus folgert der Kapitalismus gegenüber den Kolonialländern die gewaltsame Aneignung der wichtigsten Produktionsmittel als eine Lebensfrage für sich. Da aber gerade die primitiven sozialen Verbände der Eingeborenen der stärkste Schutzwall der Gesellschaft wie ihrer materiellen Existenzbasis sind, so erfolgt als einleitende Methode des Kapitals die systematische, planmäßige Zerstörung und Vernichtung der nichtkapitalistischen sozialen Verbände, auf die es in seiner Ausbreitung stößt. Hier haben wir es nicht mehr mit der primitiven Akkumulation zu tun, der Prozeß dauert fort bis auf den heutigen Tag. Jede neue Kolonialerweiterung wird naturgemäß von diesem hartnäckigen Krieg des Kapitals gegen die sozialen und ökonomischen Zusammenhänge der Eingeborenen begleitet sowie von dem gewaltsamen Raub ihrer Produktionsmittel und ihrer Arbeitskräfte. Die Hoffnung, den Kapitalismus ausschließlich auf den ›friedlichen Wettbewerb‹, d. h. auf den regelrechten Warenhandel, wie er zwischen kapitalistisch produzierenden Ländern geführt wird, als die einzige Grundlage seiner Akkumulation verweisen zu können,

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beruht auf der doktrinären Täuschung, als ob die Kapitalakkumulation ohne die Produktivkräfte und die Nachfrage primitiverer Gebilde auskommen, sich auf den langsamen inneren Zersetzungsprozeß der Naturalwirtschaft verlassen könnte. So wenig die Kapitalakkumulation in ihrer sprunghaften Ausdehnungsfähigkeit auf den natürlichen Zuwachs der Arbeiterbevölkerung zu warten und mit ihm auszukommen vermag, so wenig wird sie auch die natürliche langsame Zersetzung der nichtkapitalistischen Formen und ihren Übergang zur Warenwirtschaft abwarten und sich mit ihm begnügen. Das Kapital kennt keine andere Lösung der Frage als Gewalt, die eine ständige Methode der Kapitalakkumulation als geschichtlicher Prozeß ist, nicht bloß bei der Genesis, sondern bis auf den heutigen Tag. Für die primitiven Gesellschaften aber gibt es, da es sich in jedem solchen Falle um Sein oder Nichtsein handelt, kein anderes Verhalten als Widerstand und Kampf auf Tod und Leben, bis zur völligen Erschöpfung oder bis zur Ausrottung. Daher die ständige militärische Besetzung der Kolonien, die Aufstände der Eingeborenen und die Kolonialexpeditionen zu ihrer Niederwerfung als permanente Erscheinungen auf der Tagesordnung des Kolonialregimes. Die gewaltsame Methode ist hier die direkte Folge des Zusammenpralls des Kapitalismus mit naturalwirtschaftlichen Formationen, die seiner Akkumulation Schranken setzen. Ohne ihre Produktionsmittel und Arbeitskräfte kann er nicht auskommen, so wenig wie ohne ihre Nachfrage nach seinem Mehrprodukt. Um ihnen aber Produktionsmittel und Arbeitskräfte zu entziehen, um sie in Warenabnehmer zu verwandeln, strebt er zielbewußt danach, sie als selbständige soziale Gebilde zu vernichten.

Rosa Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals. Ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus* (1913), 27. Kapitel: Der Kampf gegen die Naturalwirtschaft, quoted from: Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke, Band VI*, Berlin: Vereinigung Internationaler Verlags-Anstalten, 1923, pp. 290–292

A history of women and reproduction in the “transition to capital” must begin with the struggles that the European medieval proletariat—small peasants, artisans, day laborers—waged against feudal power in all its forms. Only if we evoke these struggles, with their rich cargo of demands, social and political aspirations, and antagonistic practices, can we understand the role that women had in the crisis of feudalism, and why their power had to be destroyed for capitalism to develop, as it was by the three-century-long persecution of the witches. From the vantage point of this struggle, we can also see that capitalism was not the product of an evolutionary development bringing forth economic forces that were maturing in the womb of the old order. Capitalism was the response of the feudal lords, the patrician merchants, the bishops and popes, to a centuries-long social conflict that, in the end, shook their power, and truly gave “all the world a big jolt.” Capitalism was the counter-revolution that destroyed the possibilities that had emerged from the anti-feudal struggle—possibilities which if realized, might have spared us the immense destruction of lives and the natural environment that has marked the advance of capitalist relations worldwide. This much must be stressed, for the belief that capitalism “evolved” from feudalism and represents a higher form of social life has not yet been dispelled.

Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch. Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*, New York: Autonomedia, 2004, p. 21

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Le monde colonisé est un monde coupé en deux. La ligne de partage, la frontière en est indiquée par les casernes et les postes de police. Aux colonies, l'interlocuteur valable et institutionnel du colonisé, le porte-parole du colon et du régime d'oppression est le gendarme ou le soldat. Dans les sociétés de type capitaliste, l'enseignement, religieux ou laïque, la formation de réflexes moraux transmissibles de père en fils, l'honnêteté exemplaire d'ouvriers décorés après cinquante années de bons et loyaux services, l'amour encouragé de l'harmonie et de la sagesse, ces formes esthétiques du respect de l'ordre établi, créent autour de l'exploité une atmosphère de soumission et d'inhibition qui allège considérablement la tâche des forces de l'ordre. Dans les pays capitalistes, entre l'exploité et le pouvoir s'interposent une multitude de professeurs de morale, de conseillers, de « désorientateurs ». Dans les régions coloniales, par contre, le gendarme et le soldat, par leur présence immédiate, leurs interventions directes et fréquentes, maintiennent le contact avec le colonisé et lui conseillent, à coups de crosse ou de napalm, de ne pas bouger. On le voit, l'intermédiaire du pouvoir utilise un langage de pure violence. L'intermédiaire n'allège pas l'oppression, ne voile pas la domination. Il les expose, les manifeste avec la bonne conscience des forces de l'ordre. L'intermédiaire porte la violence dans les maisons et dans les cerveaux du colonisé.

Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre* (1961), Paris: La Découverte 1985/2004, p. 42

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Der Imperialismus ist der politische Ausdruck des Prozesses der Kapitalakkumulation in ihrem Konkurrenzkampf um die Reste des noch nicht mit Beschlag belegten nichtkapitalistischen Weltmilieus. Geographisch umfaßt dieses Milieu heute noch die weitesten Gebiete der Erde. Gemessen jedoch an der gewaltigen Masse des bereits akkumulierten Kapitals der alten kapitalistischen Länder, das um die Absatzmöglichkeiten für sein Mehrprodukt wie um Kapitalisierungsmöglichkeiten für seinen Mehrwert ringt, gemessen ferner an der Rapidität, mit der heute Gebiete vorkapitalistischer Kulturen in kapitalistische verwandelt werden, mit anderen Worten: gemessen an dem bereits erreichten hohen Grad der Entfaltung der Produktivkräfte des Kapitals, erscheint das seiner Expansion noch verbleibende Feld als ein geringer Rest. Demgemäß gestaltet sich das internationale Vorgehen des Kapitals auf der Weltbühne. Bei der hohen Entwicklung und der immer heftigeren Konkurrenz der kapitalistischen Länder um die Erwerbung nichtkapitalistischer Gebiete nimmt der Imperialismus an Energie und an Gewalttätigkeit zu, sowohl in seinem aggressiven Vorgehen gegen die nichtkapitalistische Welt, wie in der Verschärfung der Gegensätze zwischen den konkurrierenden kapitalistischen Ländern. Je gewalttätiger, energischer und gründlicher der Imperialismus aber den Untergang nichtkapitalistischer Kulturen besorgt, um so rascher entzieht er der Kapitalakkumulation den Boden unter den Füßen. Der Imperialismus ist ebenso sehr eine geschichtliche Methode der Existenzverlängerung des Kapitals, wie das sicherste Mittel, dessen Existenz auf kürzestem Wege objektiv ein Ziel zu setzen. Damit ist nicht gesagt, daß dieser Endpunkt pedantisch erreicht werden muß. Schon die Tendenz

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zu diesem Endziel der kapitalistischen Entwicklung äußert sich in Formen, die die Schlußphase des Kapitalismus zu einer Periode der Katastrophen gestalten.

Rosa Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals. Ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus* (1913), 31. Kapitel: Schutzzoll und Akkumulation, quoted from: Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke, Band VI*, Berlin: Vereinigung Internationaler Verlags-Anstalten, 1923, p. 361

**Le peuple comprend que la richesse n'est pas le fruit du travail mais le résultat d'un vol organisé et protégé.**

Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre* (1961), Paris: La Découverte 1985/2004, p. 182

Die kapitalistische Akkumulation hat somit als Ganzes, als konkreter geschichtlicher Prozeß, zwei verschiedene Seiten. Die eine vollzieht sich in der Produktionsstätte des Mehrwerts – in der Fabrik, im Bergwerk, auf dem landwirtschaftlichen Gut – und auf dem Warenmarkt. Die Akkumulation ist, von dieser Seite allein betrachtet, ein rein ökonomischer Prozeß, dessen wichtigste Phase zwischen dem Kapitalisten und dem Lohnarbeiter sich abspielt, der sich aber in beiden Phasen: im Fabrikraum wie auf dem Markt ausschließlich in den Schranken des Warenaustausches, des Austausches von Äquivalenten bewegt. Friede, Eigentum und Gleichheit herrschen hier als Form, und es bedurfte der scharfen Dialektik einer wissenschaftlichen Analyse, um zu enthüllen, wie bei der Akkumulation Eigentumsrecht in Aneignung fremden Eigentums, Warenaustausch in Ausbeutung, Gleichheit in Klassenherrschaft umschlagen.

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Die andere Seite der Kapitalakkumulation vollzieht sich zwischen dem Kapital und nichtkapitalistischen Produktionsformen. Ihr Schauplatz ist die Weltbühne. Hier herrschen als Methoden Kolonialpolitik, internationales Anleihesystem, Politik der Interessensphären, Kriege. Hier treten ganz unverhüllt und offen Gewalt, Betrug, Bedrückung, Plünderung zutage, und es kostet Mühe, unter diesem Wust der politischen Gewaltakte und Kraftproben die strengen Gesetze des ökonomischen Prozesses aufzufinden.

Die bürgerlich-liberale Theorie faßt nur die eine Seite: die Domäne des ›friedlichen Wettbewerbs‹, der technischen Wunderwerke und des reinen Warenhandels ins Auge, um die andere Seite, das Gebiet der geräuschvollen Gewaltstreiche des Kapitals als mehr oder minder zufällige Äußerungen der ›auswärtigen Politik‹ von der ökonomischen Domäne des Kapitals zu trennen.

In Wirklichkeit ist die politische Gewalt auch hier nur das Vehikel des ökonomischen Prozesses, die beiden Seiten der Kapitalakkumulation sind durch die Reproduktionsbedingungen des Kapitals selbst organisch miteinander verknüpft, erst zusammen ergeben sie die geschichtliche Laufbahn des Kapitals. Dieses kommt nicht bloß ›von Kopf bis Zeh' aus allen Poren Blut und Schmutz triefend‹ zur Welt, sondern es setzt sich auch so Schritt für Schritt in der Welt durch und bereitet so, unter immer heftigeren konvulsivischen Zuckungen, seinen eigenen Untergang vor.

Rosa Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals. Ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus* (1913), 31. Kapitel: Schutzzoll und Akkumulation, quoted from: Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke, Band VI*, Berlin: Vereinigung Internationaler Verlags-Anstalten, 1923, p. 366–367

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I. The expropriation of European workers from their means of subsistence, and the enslavement of Native Americans and Africans to the mines and plantations of the “New World,” were not the only means by which a world proletariat was formed and “accumulated.”

II. This process required the transformation of the body into a work-machine, and the subjugation of women to the reproduction of the work-force. Most of all, it required the destruction of the power of women which, in Europe as in America, was achieved through the extermination of the “witches.”

III. Primitive accumulation, then, was not simply an accumulation and concentration of exploitable workers and capital. It was also *an accumulation of differences and divisions within the working class*, whereby hierarchies built upon gender, as well as “race” and age, became constitutive of class rule and the formation of the modern proletariat.

Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch. Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*, New York: Autonomedia, 2004, p. 63

bois et les produits exotiques. L'Europe est littéralement la création du tiers monde.

Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre* (1961), Paris: La Découverte 1985/2004, p. 99

Très concrètement l'Europe s'est enflée de façon démesurée de l'or et des matières premières des pays coloniaux : Amérique latine, Chine, Afrique. De tous ces continents, en face desquels l'Europe aujourd'hui dresse sa tour opulente, partent depuis des siècles en direction de cette même Europe les diamants et le pétrole, la soie et le coton, les

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
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A sign expressing feelings concerning the Teton Dam was posted next to wrecked homes in Rexburg during cleanup efforts.

Post Register file photo

Local newspaper article on the 20th anniversary of the Teton Dam failure in Rexburg, USA.



Furnishing fabric manufactured by the First Factory of Printed Cotton, Russia, 1920s.


Il faut montrer que devant le phénomène collectif débordant de la grande ville, nos initiatives, nos forces, nos moyens, ne sont plus individuels comme jadis, et par là limités et inefficaces, mais qu'ils procèdent de cette fusion intense de toutes les énergies, née du progrès tout neuf qui a forgé notre siècle; que ces initiatives, ces forces, ces moyens sont une espèce de colossale pyramide dont les assises successives sont faites des individus groupés, ramassés, enrégimentés par le mouvement aujourd'hui universel de l'idée. Il faut montrer cet événement récent de solidarité inter-humaine, inter-nationale, inter-continentale. Au xx<sup>e</sup> siècle, la pensée est solidaire en tous points du monde; un acte n'est plus issu de la seule puissance d'un homme; un acte, une action, une entreprise, sont une mise en œuvre de moyens universels; ceux-ci résultent du travail innombrable de tous. Collaboration authentique. Un homme est tout petit et sa pensée peut être médiocre; mais il dispose de l'outillage du monde.

Ce progrès — récent — s'enfle chaque jour; l'heure de la science a sonné (elle n'avait pas sonné jusqu'ici, avant le machinisme). Que savons-nous de demain, sinon que nous verrons des transformations aujourd'hui imprévisibles, nous qui sommes déjà essoufflés par ce démarrage rapide de vingt ans. Nos pères, nos grands-pères, ont eu une autre existence et un autre milieu. Notre existence actuelle est anormale, est déséquilibrée et notre milieu antagoniste est insupportable. Nous disposons désormais de la collaboration universelle pour réaliser ce que l'esprit conçoit pour une date proche, échéance irrécusable. Un exemple entre mille va l'expliquer.

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
C'est un immense barrage en construction dans les Alpes. Problème technique simple : de la patience et de l'exactitude pour relever les niveaux de la vallée et de ses versants. Une multiplication pour cuber l'eau du lac artificiel qui sera créé. Un peu de règle à calcul pour résoudre quelques formules relativement simples. On conclut : il faut élever un barrage de tant de mètres de long, tant de mètres de haut; il aura telle épaisseur à la base, telle au sommet, la poussée sur le barrage étant de tant. Un esprit moyen peut faire le tour de ces calculs : étape insignifiante.

Mais les chiffres sont écrasants, le cube de béton qu'il faut couler là est colossal. Le barrage se trouve à 2.500 mètres d'altitude, à la limite des neiges éternelles. Cette vallée est au bout du monde, loin de toutes gares et de tout chemin; autour, des



Le Barrage.

Spread from Le Corbusier, *Urbanisme*,  
showing the construction site of  
the Barberine Dam in the Swiss Alps, 1924.



Poster by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a U.S. government agency, advocating the necessity of dam construction for energy production, 1942.

(PRIMITIVE) ACCUMULATION



David Lilienthal, head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, speaking at the inauguration of the Cherokee Dam, 1941.

KOOPERATIVE FÜR DARSTELLUNGSPOLITIK




Remains of the Austin Dam in Pennsylvania, USA, which failed soon after construction in 1911.

(PRIMITIVE) ACCUMULATION



Promotional photo of Herman Sörgel, planner of the Atlantropa project, in the office of *The New York Times*, date unknown.

KOOPERATIVE FÜR DARSTELLUNGSPOLITIK



Map of the Atlantropa project showing the various hydro-engineering constructions around the Mediterranean Sea.

(PRIMITIVE) ACCUMULATION




Fig. 17. Chemnitz-Talsperre.

Illustration from Otto Lueger's *Lexikon der Gesamten Technik*, an encyclopedia of architectural, engineering and manufacturing technology, first published in 1894.

KOOPERATIVE FÜR DARSTELLUNGSPOLITIK



Formerly the fourth-largest lake in the world, the Aral Sea has been shrinking since the 1960s after the rivers that fed it were diverted for Soviet irrigation projects.

**(PRIMITIVE) ACCUMULATION**




Protest against the displacement of people for the construction of the Baram Dam in Malaysia in 2016.

**KOOPERATIVE FÜR DARSTELLUNGSPOLITIK**



A group of international architects and urban planners on a trip organised by the French architecture magazine *L'Architecture d'aujourd'hui* to the Soviet Union in 1932, to visit projects of the first five-year plan.

(PRIMITIVE) ACCUMULATION



Functional diagram of a hydroelectric dam from Wikipedia.

KOOPERATIVE FÜR DARSTELLUNGSPOLITIK

C B A C M K V A A R D E S

C B L A I C M V A A T F E D S

B C A L C I M V A T A E F S D

B A C C L I M A T E A S R D

Italy ranks alongside China as the world's second largest producer of tomatoes for processing (after the United States). Italy produces fourteen percent of the world supply of tomatoes and forty-nine percent of the European market. Annual turnover is 3.1 billion euros. Outside of Europe, the USA is the main buyer of Italian tomatoes, while a significant proportion are sold to parts of Africa. [For example, Ghana used to produced large quantities of tomatoes for the local market, but imports have increased by 650 percent, due to the lower cost of imported (Italian) product. In turn, this has contributed to a large number of former African farmers leaving their home country to come to Italy in search of work.]

An estimated 430,000 workers each year are employed through *caporali*. In the main tomato producing region of Italy, Puglia, large settlements are built every summer providing a home to thousands of potential workers. The best known of these settlements is the "gran ghetto" (big ghetto) in Rignano Garganico, an illegal slum in a large vacant lot that is located in the municipality of San Severo. Here—at the peak of the season—2000 to 2500 live in self-built shacks of wood and corrugated iron. They wait to be recruited by *caporali*, to whom they also pay the cost of transport to the fields (from 2 to 5 euros). *Caporali* then get another percentage (20 to 50 cents) from the employer for each caisson picked by members of their team.

Alessandra Spigno and Phil Marshall, "Labour conditions in the Italian tomato-growing sector," background paper published by RCG Research and Communications Group, Wellington, New Zealand, 31.5.2017, pp. 3-4 (<http://rcgglobal.net/pubs/tomato.pdf>). Courtesy of the authors



**NUOVO CEPPPO**

# **EMPACT F1**

pomodoro ovale di colore intenso  
e ottimo gusto

Ibrido Innovativo

Resistenze:

HR:TSWV:0/

Pst:0/Fol:0,1/

Va:0/Vd:0

IR: TSWV:1/ Ma/ Mi/ Mj/ Pi

pianta molto vigorosa,  
sana e produttiva

peso frutto: 80g



While the perception of migrant invasion arises in Italy, people fleeing conflict and war or moving for socio-economic structural violence continue to die, along routes across the deserts, and in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea. Massive casualties are seen as the consequence of Europe's refusal to face their historical and current political responsibility. In recent years after the downgrading of search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean (from Mare Nostrum to Triton/ Frontex), EU ministers for internal affairs, as well as senior officers in the border security forces have verbally attacked, legally undermined and politically isolated NGOs' search and rescue operations (SAR NGOs) in the Mediterranean. The truth was clear that border defence, not the protection of life, remains the priority for Europe's frontiers, while those assisting refugees to find a safe place, to feed or clothe them are blamed for the "crime" of solidarity. This situation has also opened the way to neo fascist groups to reinforce their positions as in the case of "defend Europe" groups.


The migration phenomena, instead, can be analysed in parallel with the intensification of the agro-industrial production systems, both in the places of origin and in destination countries. Since the 80s, there has been an enormous accumulation of capital as a consequence of a new agro food regime, dominated by transnational corporations (McMichael). Information technology, communication, transport and science developments (linked to changing consumption models) enabled the constant intensification of production, as well as the growth of large-scale organised distribution networks. A brand-new labour architecture was shaped, after the geographical reorganisation of the agro-food systems, connecting the

world peripheries where production takes place, with consumption centres.

Within this framework, intensive fruit and vegetable production spread through southern European countries in the most important rural areas of the continent, employing migrant workers. The workers represent a low cost labour force and reduce production costs. A kind of “delocalisation on the place” stabilises profit so that production becomes competitive on the global market. Both large-scale and family farms employed migrant workforce in Italy. In both cases, the farming systems depend heavily on the phyto-sanitary industry, or on the large market retailers through contract farming schemes, or to the large fruit and vegetable markets, as in the case analysed below.

This situation is the result of several causes, such as the very nature of contemporary capitalism, the current legal framework on migration rights, at both Italian and EU level, the rules set forth by the large market retailers, and the lack of social policies that are poorly organised and weakened by years of budget cuts.

Paola De Meo and Marco Omizzolo, “Exploited and invisible: what role for migrant workers in our food system?,” Conference paper no. 36, ERPI 2018 International Conference “Authoritarian Populism and the Rural World,” pp. 4–5 ([https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/2018-03/ERPI%20CP%2036\\_%20Meo%20and%20Omizzolo.pdf](https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/2018-03/ERPI%20CP%2036_%20Meo%20and%20Omizzolo.pdf)). Courtesy of the authors





















↑ ASCOLI S.

A 16 BARI  
NAPOLI

SS 90 NAPOLI

SP 105 CANDELA

SP 105 FOGGIA

CASTELLUCCIO DEI SAURI
























Gibst du mir Steine geb ich dir  
Gibst du mir Steine ich dir  
Gibst du mir Steine geb ich  
Gibst du mir Steine geb

Gibst du mir Wasser  
Gibst du mir Wasser  
Gibst du mir Wasser  
Gibst du mir Wasser

ich  
ich  
ich  
ich  
Kalk  
Kalk  
Kalk  
Kalk

Schau ich dich an

RELAZIONI UMANE  
NEL RIFERIRE ITINERARI  
QUANTO PIU' UNO RIFERISCE

Gibst du mir Wasser  
Gibst du mir Wasser  
Gibst du mir Wasser  
Gibst du mir Wasser

ich  
ich  
ich  
Kalk  
Kalk  
Kalk  
Kalk

# ANKERZENTRUM

RUIN US



Mahleuer  
ANKER-Einrichtung  
Donauwörth



Schrittfahren  
Hier gilt  
die StVO



# MOBILE BORDER REGIMES OF ACCUMULATION

## AN INCOMPLETE GLOSSARY

EDITED BY  
FELIX MEYER, SEDA NAIUMAD,  
FRITZ LAZLO WEBER

## HERE AND THERE

Colonialism, with its demarcations and exploitative regimes, was built upon a pictorial narrative of “Here” and “There.” The narrative was nourished by a juxtaposition of man and nature, in which nature is inevitably subjugated. The colonialist image hierarchically depicted Europe as the Here—the superior, enlightened, progressive centre of civilisation—and Africa, America, Australia and parts of Asia as comprising the There—a primitive and uncultivated “nature” that apparently was not aware of its treasures and not capable of capitalising upon them.

The image of Here and There served a strategic valuation and accordingly justified the conquest and domination of life forms and habitats. The There was made available as a resource for the growing needs of Europe and for the expansion of capital. On maps, the land was divided up with a ruler and allocated in the form of colonies. The newly accessed raw materials, goods, labour and the resulting profits were also needed in order to finance colonial warfare. The expansion of capital, which had reached its limits in Europe despite massive, violent redistribution through reinforced boundaries, expulsion, witch hunts—and despite the separation of production from reproduction—was guaranteed by the colonies.

The racist distinction between “primitive natives” and “civilised” White citizens legitimised the exploitation and destruction of indigenous populations. In particular, the Black populations of Africa and their descendants in America were denied the status of the humanist and civilisational category “human.” A workforce for the enterprises aimed at expanding capital was secured by militarily organised deportation into slavery. Colonialism and slavery, therefore, do not represent the flip side, but rather the prerequisite of modern European cultures.

Triggered by various factors—including the emergence of emancipatory movements as well as the crisis of Fordism, decolonisation and the Movement of Non-Aligned States (NAM), public debt incurred through wars and rising crude oil prices—in the 1970s, a prolonged phase of expansion in industrial production of the former colonial powers came to an end, and the Here and There was renegotiated. Simultaneously, a distinct precarisation and devaluation reappeared within Europe. Among other measures, capital responded to this crisis of accumulation by relocating industrial sites to so-called low-wage countries, making labour markets more flexible, automating and ultimately financialising work processes, including trade and logistics chains.

## ON THE MOVE

The increasing mobilisation of people and other forms of life worldwide is a direct response to the destructive power and violence of capital and the existential impact of this violence on all living environments. Anthropogenic climate change, loss of biodiversity, austerity and wars are the effects of habitat destruction. In particular, the concomitant economic pressure affects people from (formerly) colonised areas. According to a UN survey, since 2015, the migratory movement of humans has affected 250 million individuals worldwide, not counting domestic migration.

In response thereto, mutable and mobile border regimes are being formed, protecting European or other hegemonies and the distributional relationships that were established in colonial processes.

These border regimes are rapidly growing, becoming more militarised and technologically advanced. Thereby, they are responding to the various movements, practices and demands of migration with an ever-increasing rigorousness and with the introduction of new frontier forms. These forms can be arranged loosely into spatial boundaries, time limits and legal constructions. All forms are increasingly militarily supported and may override international conventions on fundamental human rights, maritime rescue and even existing laws. In doing so, mobile border regimes are updating a colonial practice that creates legal and extralegal resources and extends them beyond their own national territory to defend their hegemonic and neocolonial interests. Under the mottos “No human is illegal,” “No Border” and “Sans-Papiers,” various solidarity networks formed to oppose the illegalisation of migration. They campaign for the right to free movement and mobility as a human right and point to the racist orientation of the illegalisation.

Human movement through migration continues to grow, despite seemingly insurmountable migration controls. In Europe many people only became aware of this increase during the Summer of Migration in 2015.

## ALMANYA

The nation-state is founded on the distinction between groups of people. The fundamental difference is between those whom the law recognises as nationals and those who are considered foreigners and are thus excluded from the privileging rights of citizenship. Foreigners are classified according to the potential economic value of their immigration with respect to the national economy.

Migration policy in Germany can be told along the lines of this very question—and the changing answers thereto. In turn, the history of migration in *Almanya* (Germany) can be narrated across the contours of resistance against the conditions of this classification.

Starting in the 1950s, around 14 million workers were acquired from abroad by the Federal Republic of Germany by virtue of labour recruitment agreements which had been concluded, in particular, with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, South Korea, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. They were needed in a period of industrial expansion to meet the constant demand for factory workers. Initially, many of those workers were housed in so-called *Gastarbeiter-Lager*n (guest worker camps) little more than barracks, which in many cases had served as Nazi forced labour camps during the Second World War.

The migrant workers who co-produced the German *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle) as of 1955 were not regarded as part of German society, but rather as “guests.” With the onset of recession following the oil crisis in 1973, a general recruitment ban was implemented, and the “guests” were shown that they were no longer needed and should leave Germany. Their exclusion was driven by immigration restrictions in cities with a high proportion of foreigners and through political campaigns aimed primarily at immigrants from Turkey. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) declared in 1982, “I won’t let any more Turks through the border.” And Schmidt’s successor, Helmut Kohl (CDU), wanted to halve the number of people originating from Turkey within the Federal Republic, given that they—in contrast, for example, to the Italians and the Portuguese—were deemed to be of non-European heritage and regarded as “neither fit for integration nor willing to be integrated.” As a matter of law, “readiness to return” was to be encouraged, indeed, it was even expressly promoted by means of a premium payment for voluntary repatriation in order to relieve the national budget of social security benefits allocated for unemployed foreigners.

This official xenophobic policy was soon followed by the first racially motivated arson attacks (Hamburg 1980, Duisburg 1984, Mölln 1992, Solingen 1993) and mob violence (Hoyerswerda 1991, Rostock-Lichtenhagen 1992) as well as the radicalisation of neo-Nazi groups. However, the migrants had already arrived, as it were. Indeed, they had learned as guest workers to organise and to fight for their rights. They stayed, finally becoming independent of work in the factories. They successfully opened shops, businesses and restaurants and influenced the shared, everyday life in the cities: the beginning of post-migrant society in *Almanya*.

# ASYLUM

In the wake of the recruitment ban for guest workers in 1973, one of the few legal possibilities of staying in Almanyia and the EU for most of the people with non-European nationality was the application for asylum, refugee protection or subsidiary protection.

Article 16 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of the Federal Republic grants all politically persecuted persons the right of asylum. The right of asylum in the constitution is a direct consequence of the experiences of the Nazi regime and the Second World War. The Federal Republic thus adopted many of the recommendations of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and, from 1954, also adhered to the Geneva Convention, which is binding under international law. Before the recruitment stop in 1973, most asylum seekers came from the so-called Eastern Bloc countries and were tolerated for "humanitarian reasons" in the spirit of Cold War ideology. After 1973, demographics changed, and the number of applicants, mostly from the countries of the Trikont reached a previous high point in 1992. Different strategies were employed in order to respond to the growing number of applications for asylum. German policy was now categorically geared towards warding off migrants.

The problematisation of asylum was and is mainly legitimised by the narrative of asylum abuse or asylum fraud. In addition, the escalating, aggressive tone in the debate on the right of asylum from the entire political spectrum ("The boat is full") was fuelled by a growing nationalist sentiment subsequent to the almagamation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, respectively West and East Germany, in 1990 ("We are one people"). The wave of xenophobic violence in the early 1990s was interpreted as an expression of extreme anxiety by the German population (Helmut Kohl, "State of emergency"), which had to be managed by a tightening of the asylum law.

The fundamental right of asylum under Article 16 was redrafted in 1993 in several paragraphs and with the help of the so-called Asylum Procedures Act significantly limited the scope of protection. Asylum petitioners, stigmatised and criminalised as a result, were held responsible for the state repression against them and the racially motivated hostility and attacks of the German population. They were considered to be a burden and to present a danger to the functioning of the asylum system in particular and the state in general. Further legislative changes to restrict asylum law followed, and the recognition rate fell below two percent.

Meanwhile, asylum seekers are no longer able to reach Almanyia by land legally because the right of asylum is denied to those entering from a "safe third country" in the event their fingerprints were taken there. The list of safe third countries includes all EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland. This buffer zone of neighbouring states shifts Almanyia's borders to the EU's external borders.

## SAFE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Since the significant restriction of the fundamental right of asylum (1993), and pursuant to the introduction of a newly crafted legal term, the "safe country of origin," asylum seekers have been classified by origin. As a result, applications from these legally designated safe countries of origin are rejected as "manifestly unfounded." The rejection is based on the presumption that there is no threat of political persecution in safe countries of origin. This assumption must then be refuted in individual cases.

According to the legislators, sorting by origin should accelerate the asylum procedure, i.e. the persons affected are subjected to restrictive legal requirements in order to accelerate deportation: shorter deadlines, labour bans, minimal material and medical care and—since the Asylum Package I of 2015—they are forced to live in the camp until the end of the procedure or until deportation. These fundamental cuts in the autonomy of asylum seekers should do away with so-called "disincentives," such as humane living conditions.

## GOOD STAY PERSPECTIVE, BAD STAY PERSPECTIVE

Since 2015, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) has been statistically constructing so-called *gute Bleibeperspektive* (good stay) or *schlechte Bleibeperspektive* (bad stay perspective). Only asylum seekers from countries with an average asylum application recognition rate of more than fifty percent have a good chance of staying (in 2017, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Somalia). Only people with a "good stay perspective" can take part in integration courses and support programmes so that they can then be better integrated into the labour market. People from all other states, with a recognition rate of less than fifty percent, that is to say, a "bad stay perspective," should be deported as soon as possible.

## DEPORTATION

Deportations serve as a central means of defence against migration. The deportation, euphemistically also referred to as repatriation, is a coercive measure in which asylum seekers are deported to the country of origin or a third country. In accordance with the Dublin Regulations, most people are deported to the EU country of first registration, often Italy or Spain.

An intensification of German deportation practices was pursued with the Asylum Packages I and II (2015/2016): deportations are no longer announced in advance, deadlines for petitioners are being reduced, the list of "safe countries of origin" is being steadily expanded, and asylum seekers from these states will continue, until the procedure's end, to be concentrated in *Abschiebelagern* (deportation camps, see also anchor centres), isolated and monitored.

So-called deportation obstacles exist *inter alia* in the case of illness or pregnancy, or if the target state refuses to accept a person. Missing identity documents can also be an effective obstacle to deportations, according to an evaluation by the Federal Working Group for Repatriation.

Many attempted deportations fail due to resistance or because the person concerned is not locatable. Residents of deportation camps used, among other things, whistles in 2017 as a form of protest and as an effective means of preventing the nightly deportations. The noise led in many cases to the abandonment of the deportation. In order to prevent deportations being carried out in homes, in the workplace or at school, there has notably been repeated support from third persons through civil disobedience and other acts of solidarity. In the case of planned deportation flights, pilots have refused to take off and thus prevented in 2017, in almost 300 cases, the execution of deportations.

The Federal Republic and the European Union have the intention to conclude so-called repatriation agreements with several, mostly African states. These agreements are intended to rescind the requirement of a number of obligations incumbent upon the deporting states, such as the collection of proof of citizenship and to limit the possibilities for opposition with regard to the host states. The associations of deportees in Mali and Togo, who oppose the introduction of these agreements, are against forced repatriation. Thanks to the level of civil social protest in Mali, for example, an agreement has not yet been reached with that country.

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#### SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION (DULDUNG)

Rejected asylum seekers, who cannot be deported immediately due to so-called deportation obstacles, receive a “certificate of temporary suspension of deportation.” In German, it is officially described as a *Duldung*, literally a form of toleration. At the end of 2017, some 166,740 people in Almanyia were affected by this regulation. Generally, as soon as the obstacle is removed, they are deported. Such suspensions are usually granted only for very short periods of time with a maximum six months, so that renewals must be requested repeatedly—in some cases within a few days, because only with a “tolerated” stay in Almanyia can one continue to reside with impunity and thus be formally exempt from punishment. The *Duldung* is a non-status between legal and unlawful stay in Almanyia.

For many affected people, this means years, sometimes decades, in a legally precarious situation without secured

status and no chance of improving it—this is called *Kettenduldungen* (chain toleration). They are subject to stricter restrictions, especially if they come from safe countries of origin.

For this group of people, a general labour ban applies. In exceptional cases, and as a matter of discretion, the immigration authorities may grant a work permit after a minimum stay of three months. The latter possibility, however, exists only if those “tolerated” do not come from a safe country of origin and have not violated their obligation to cooperate, as discussed below. Additionally, the Agentur für Arbeit (Federal Employment Office) must ascertain whether a particular job is not primarily reserved for a person with status appropriate (German passport or EU member state) entitlement. Often, the checking procedure takes too long for employers, and the job is given to someone else.

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#### OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE (MITWIRKUNGSPFLICHT)

The position of the already largely disenfranchised, tolerated person is made even worse by the legal requirement to cooperate. This obliges those who are tolerated to actively participate in their own deportation. For example, they must cooperate with the responsible immigration authorities in establishing their identity or in obtaining passports and papers. Anyone who contravenes this obligation will be punished by sanctions such as the termination of financial aid or a ban on work.

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#### RESIDENCE OBLIGATION (RESIDENZPFLICHT)

The freedom of movement for asylum seekers in Almanyia is restricted by the so-called *Residenzpflicht* (residence obligation). If the “residence obligation” applies, asylum seekers may not leave the district assigned to them without the prior approval of the authorities. If they break this rule, they will be punished with fines or imprisonment. This form of violation of the human right to freedom of movement is unique in Europe.

In a series of self-organised protests, which were summarised as the Refugee Strike Movement, asylum seekers from all over Almanyia and beyond, starting in the spring of 2012, demanded the end of the residence obligation, camp housing and deportations. At the beginning of the protests, a joint march extending from Würzburg to Berlin (a distance of some 430 km) took place, an act which deliberately violated the residence obligation of the participants and also enabled them to visit other camps and accommodation centres in order to mobilise the residents there for further protests.

As a direct consequence, the residence obligation was abolished nationwide for a short time, only to be reintroduced in the autumn of 2015 via a number of new regulations, among them the Asylum Package I.

## DUBLIN

The Dublin rules are a series of European regulations that have been in force since 1997 and have been tightened several times, obliging migrants to make their application for asylum in the EU state of their first registration. Anyone who then moves on to another EU country is forcibly returned to the previous location respectively receives a deportation order (Abschiebebescheid) and can be deported pursuant to the Dublin regulations.

At the same time, this process puts considerable pressure on the peripheral states of the EU to make every effort to close the external border migration routes. While the liberalisation of the EU internal market abolished border controls within the EU under the Schengen Agreement of 1985, new and uniform border regimes have emerged along the previously passable external borders. And the pressure on the member states at the perimeter is being violently passed on to the migrants in the form of illegal and often brutal repatriations at the borders, so-called "push-backs."

The mobility of migrants is thus limited legally to a zone on the southern and south-eastern fringes of the EU. In the south of Italy, many of the migrants without rights find themselves in working structures equivalent to slave labour as harvesters in the fields.

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## EURODAC / DATABASES

Since 2003, the EU has been operating the EURODAC database, which stores fingerprints and information as to the alleged gender and suspected origin of all asylum seekers in Europe. The collection, storage and interconnection of biometric and personal data has the objective of providing access to individual asylum seekers throughout the EU, thereby helping to enforce deportations and the Dublin regulations.

To this end, the EU also financially and technologically supports African countries in the introduction of biometric passports and related databases. While EURODAC has been a key management tool for the EU's repressive population management from the outset, its security nature has become more apparent since it became accessible in 2013 to state investigative bodies such as the police and intelligence services.

Recent legislative proposals by the European Parliament for a European asylum system seek to extend this practice. The database shall be supplemented with passport photos and the minimum age of inclusion should be reduced from fourteen to six years. The previously separate databases EURODAC, the visa information system of all EU countries (VIS) and the pan-European police data-

base SIS for law enforcement (Schengen Information System) are to be linked through a common search interface. The integration of law enforcement, migration management and police prevention should be seen in the context of the general trend of steadily increasing military and intelligence capabilities of the security apparatus in EU countries and the increasing criminalisation of migration.

# CAMP SYSTEMS

The institution of the *Lager* (camp) as a means of exclusion and simultaneous confinement of certain groups of people, forms a structurally important component in the current and historical process of mobile border regime and nation-state organisation. The camp inverts the border and creates extraterritoriality inside. This “contained exclusion” may also be transferred to outside the territory of a nation-state.

Camps are instruments of an identity-political and economic administrative apparatus. Historically, the constellation of the camp residents is the result of legal, police and military practices as well as identitarian, political, but also scientific discourses. The isolation of these then defined parts of the population in camps serves the narrative of a people, comprising a nation, an ethnic community that has been cleansed of asocial disorders and is healthy, productive and above all law-abiding.

The historical continuity of camps in Almany, their infrastructure and their social and economic tasks can be recognised in retrospectively reviewing the camps for insurgents against the colonial regime from 1904, for prisoners of war and forced labourers in the First and Second World Wars, for guest workers in West Germany after 1945 and finally for today’s asylum seekers. The concentration and extermination camps of the Nazis, on the other hand, were aimed not at the subjugation and control of certain sections of the population, but at their very extinction.

## WORKHOUSES

In the camp facilities, a principle continues that can be traced back to the workhouses of the 17th century. The activities and phenomena caused by poverty, such as begging, vagrancy, homelessness, were classified as illegal and punishable. The criminalised poor were housed in workhouses and made to work as a punishment for breaking the law. Thus, ways of life outside the relations of production were subjugated and manpower was effectively harnessed. The ongoing punishment of behaviours created by the prevailing conditions can be readily connected to the history of the camp as a place of discipline.

## ASYLUM CAMPS

Living in today’s mass housing for asylum seekers, with no privacy, no opportunity to cook, attend language courses or work, results in mental illness and social conflict. Policing in the camps is carried out by private security services. They limit the autonomy of the residents in their daily activities to the strict house rules, which prescribe, depending on the institution, registration and de-registration procedures within certain periods when leaving the fenced camp or which prohibit the possession of kitchen knives and other cooking utensils. Violent attacks on asylum seekers by security service employees are well documented and commonplace.

In the camps, solidary communities are constantly forming, which press for better living conditions and are engaged against the denial of fundamental rights and discrimination by security organs. For example, camp residents have organised demonstrations and strikes or prevented deportations from the camps by virtue of coordinated whistling concerts (see Deportation).

Against this form of self-organisation, legislation in Bavaria, where so-called “anchor centres” were introduced in 2018, amounts to the general legal classification of all camps as “dangerous places.” Among other things, this removes the fundamental right which is guaranteed in the Basic Law as to the inviolability of the dwelling. The police are allowed to search in the camps without cause at any time. Since March 2018, a number of large police raids involving several hundreds of armed officers using of tear gas, truncheons and restraints, sometimes with the support of heavily armed task forces, have taken place in the camps.

The participants are identified by the security forces and the camp administration during the raids and arrested for resisting state violence, breaches of the peace—sweepingly defined as *Landfriedensbruch*—or insulting, offensive behaviour, and they are judged in court. The penalties imposed are deemed to be justified as generally preventive

measures. In most cases, this approach is applied to African residents, who often experience the greatest form of disenfranchisement, given that they have a “bad stay perspective.”

The openly displayed police violence and the legal persecution of individual residents should lead to de-solidarisation among the refugees who are simply exercising their fundamental right to express their opinion. Above all, if they have acted as spokespeople of collective self-organisation or have otherwise been perceived as undesirable by security personnel, they are branded as “ringleaders” and then placed in custody for several months or transferred to other camps.

On the night of May 3rd in 2018, following an unsuccessful deportation to Italy a few days earlier, a spectacular large-scale police operation involving more than 500 task force personnel took place at the Landeserstaufnahme-einrichtung (Initial State Reception Centre) in Ellwangen. In Ellwangen, only 20 out of 130 attempted deportations were successful in 2017, mostly because the targeted person could not be located. In this case, a deportation attempt had been stopped because a larger crowd had gathered in protest in the courtyard. As a result, the operation was carried out on May 3rd, doors were broken down, residents were beaten and restrained, and several were arrested.

The operation was justified in the media as a response to an untenable state of emergency in the camps and to the violence of the African residents, who supposedly could not be controlled otherwise. In the midst of the racially charged baiting of refugees on the part of the media and politicians, Interior Minister Seehofer announced the introduction and necessity of “anchor centres” in order to get the situation under control. In the meantime, the legitimacy of the police operation, which was allegedly carried out only for purposes of identification, has been called into question by the Refugee Council of Baden-Württemberg, Aktion Bleiberecht, Justizwatch and refugee activists from Stuttgart and Augsburg.

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#### ANCHOR CENTRES (ANKERZENTREN)

As part of the coalition agreement between the governing parties of the CDU / CSU and the SPD in March 2018, so-called *Anker-Zentren* were established, and they are currently the most advanced tool of repression, isolation and observation of migrants within Germany. The official German acronym *AnKER* stands for “arrival, decision and repatriation,” and it is chained, quite tellingly, with met-

aphoric significance to the concept of an anchor, an object that restricts movement. The aim of the “anchor centres,” which were launched as pilot projects in Bavaria in August 2018, is to speed up asylum procedures and deport a large volume of people. The anchor centres are usually located in peripherally-situated former military barracks, which were previously operated under the name “transit camp” or “special reception facility” to accommodate asylum seekers.

So far, there are anchor centres in Bamberg (formerly Warner Barracks), Manching (including the former Max Immelmann Barracks), Donauwörth (formerly Alfred Delp Barracks), Schweinfurt (formerly Ledward Barracks, Conn Barracks), Deggendorf, Regensburg and Zirndorf.

The structure of mass accommodation further severely restricts the autonomy of the residents legally, socially and materially, and it isolates them from the inhabitants of the neighbouring cities. Without access to independent legal assistance and networks of solidarity, moreover, they are left without alternatives to the programmes of the BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), such as the *Rückkehrberatung* (counselling for return). They are urged to “voluntarily” repatriate due to their predicted bad stay perspective, that is, deport themselves to avoid further repercussions. Various social organisations as well as the German police union oppose the pilot project and refer to the conditions as conduits for the pre-programming of social conflicts.

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#### HOTSPOTS

Introduced in the European Agenda on Migration in 2015 and approved by the European Council, the concept “hotspot approach” is applied to migrants held in detention centres directly along the EU’s external borders in Italy and Greece. In these “hotspots,” they are immediately registered and, if possible, identified with their fingerprints being taken. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) works on-site with Frontex and Europol. The new arrivals receive no legal assistance or independent advice on asylum and migration issues in the often dramatically overcrowded hotspots and are in some hotspots de facto imprisoned. In many cases, humanitarian standards are not met or respected. Medical care is not geared to the physical and mental well-being of migrants, but primarily serves the safety-related protocols of the camp system. Institutional and voluntary humanitarian workers are criminalised if they do not support the enforcement of the border regime and do not cooperate with security.

For the current mobile border regime, camps for migrants are also established outside the territory of the European Union.

A multitiered camp system is in place in order to combat current migration movements off the borders of Europe, for example, existing camp structures in Turkey (EU-Turkey Agreement 2016) and prisons in Libya serve this purpose. Collection camps have been set up in several African states, which will in future also be the location of the asylum procedure and thus be relocated outside the EU. At the borders, unlawful push-backs occur again and again, in which the police or military force migrants back behind their respective borders.

In Libya alone, thousands of migrants from African countries are held indefinitely in camps and prisons in a hopeless situation. The crossing on one of the perilous Mediterranean routes is the goal and at the same time the only way out of a country plagued by civil war and where conditions for migrants are equivalent to those of slavery.

The voyage across the Mediterranean to Europe is a high-risk venture which is often attempted with unseaworthy and overcrowded vessels or even just inflatable boats. The number of fatalities in this respect since 2000 has been estimated as 35,000. In 2018, according to the UNHCR, 138,882 people risked the dangerous crossing, and not less than 2297 of them died during the journey.

The migration routes through Turkey, Libya, Morocco and Algeria, as well as along the open Mediterranean through the mobile border regime, encounter a dual policy of abandonment. On the one hand, the infrastructure required for migration is being eroded, which is why the crossing carries a higher risk, and on the other hand, the vessels that have increasingly come into distress no longer receive assistance.

The aim of European policy is to close the Mediterranean route for refugees and thus to deny the right to seek asylum under the UN Refugee Convention in the European Union. The ships of the Frontex Triton mission and the EU NAVFOR MED Operation Sophia are mostly deployed near Malta and Sicily, far away from the zone where inflatable boats carry refugees. In response to the failure of government agencies and following the model of the first privately organised rescue vessel, *Cap Anamur* (2004), a number of relief organisations were formed and staffed by volunteers. These include Jugend Rettet, Proactiva Open Arms, SOS Méditerranée, Mission Lifeline and Sea Watch. They attempt to guarantee "safe passage" to prevent refugee deaths in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, they support the argumentation, as demonstrated by research, "More rescuers means less death, but not more migration."

## FRONTEX

The European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) was created in 2004 to protect Europe's external borders. It has its headquarters in Warsaw, and it received an annual budget of 281 million euros in 2017. Its mandate has been steadily expanded since its founding, and this encompasses several missions, operations outside the EU borders, cooperation with third countries, e.g. the Libyan Coast Guard and militias operating there, the preparation of studies and reports or the repatriation of migrants.

Frontex began Operation Triton in 2014, replacing Mare Nostrum's rescue mission which had been launched in Italy in 2013 and had saved 80,000 lives. While the focus of Mare Nostrum was on Search and Rescue (SAR), Triton was all about defence. According to Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri, "[Rescue missions] did not correspond to Triton's mission plan and mandate." Instead, it is about deterrence, the destruction of boats and the repatriation of "irregular" migrants. Given that Frontex has not been permitted to carry out push-back operations against refugee boats under EU law on the high seas since 2014—even though the principle of non-refoulement under international law already existed pursuant to the Geneva Refugee Convention—this task is increasingly being transferred to Libyan units.

Coast Guard from now on. In December 2018, *Sea Watch 3*, with forty-nine rescued passengers on board, wandered across the Mediterranean for a total of nineteen days until Malta finally gave permission to enter. The volunteers of organisations, such as Jugend Rettet, are even being criminally prosecuted. At the same time, there are initiatives for safe havens that many cities support. The mayors of Palermo and Naples, for example, oppose the closure of the ports.

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## SEA RESCUE

Maritime rescue is a legal requirement under international maritime law, as expressly set out in the International Convention on Sea Rescue and in the SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) Convention (1974). According to this, the rescue of people in distress at sea is mandatory for all ships and crews on the high seas. Coastal states must provide adequate resources for the rescue of shipwrecked people. The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Rome is responsible for the coordination of rescue operations in the central Mediterranean. It dispatches ships to the incident scene and assigns them to the ports to be approached. In August 2017, the ship operated by Jugend Rettet, the *luventa*, was confiscated, and since then it has been held in the customs area of the Port of Trapani. Other ships have been deflagged. The centuries-old and international law enshrined sea rescue is being eroded through various measures and even criminalised. In the summer of 2018, Italy closed its ports to aid organisations that rescue refugees in distress and additional countries followed. Although, according to European jurisprudence, rescued shipwrecked persons must be taken to safe havens where they do not expect persecution or torture, rescued persons are to be handed over to the Libyan

# EXTERNALISATION / EXTRATERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES

The current border regime of the EU extends in staggered zones across the whole of Europe. In an effort to comprehensively regulate “irregular” migration as early as possible, mobile border regimes and camp systems will also be established and expanded outside the territory of the EU.

Air carriers and ferry operators must, under EU Directive 2001/51/EC, bear the costs of repatriating and managing immigrants to the EU without a visa if they are denied asylum. The principle of the Geneva Refugee Convention that asylum seekers without a visa must not be rejected, is thus undermined, and transport companies are compulsorily made accomplices of border protection policy. Border management tasks are externalised and legal and safe entry into the EU blocked.

At the same time, the EU is increasingly forcing African states to adopt the European understanding of “irregular” migration and to establish corresponding border regimes. In doing so, the European Union is thwarting the efforts of the African Union to abolish border controls in Africa. On a continent without borders before colonialism, where unrestricted mobility of migration and trade was the norm, intra-African trade and travel routes are important for the survival of many people.

The EU programmes are pushing African countries to introduce biometric passport systems, establishing checkpoints and camp systems, and manifesting themselves in military operations in Niger, Mali and Libya. For the implementation, protagonists such as the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), the GIZ (a German society for international cooperation), the German and Italian military as well as other organisations are involved. Increasingly large budgets are provided for the execution of programmes. Although many of these measures are declared as development aid or humanitarian missions, they serve primarily and often solely to regulate migration. In addition, payments for aid programs are linked to considerations of border protection and repatriation obligations.

These measures establish extraterritorial borders of the EU and de facto advance European border protection into the Sahara. According to UN estimates, since the checkpoints were introduced, the Sahrawi route has caused twice as many casualties as crossing the Mediterranean. Democratic structures on the ground, the interests of the population and civil society actors are ignored in order to assert European interests.

Civil society and social grassroots movements from Africa and Europe are opposing the establishment of border regimes in Africa. The struggle for freedom of movement and for just and autonomous development, i.e. being able to live under self-determined and dignified conditions, is of central importance here. For example, the transnationally organised network Afrique-Europe-Interact from Mali, Togo, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands initiated the three-week Caravan for Freedom of Movement and Fair Development in 2011 together with the Association of Deported Malis. There were organised meetings along the route from Mali to Senegal on half a dozen stops with the local population. The initiative is fighting for the

enforcement of the civil, political and social rights of migrants. In 2017, Afrique-Europe-Interact set up the AlarmPhone Sahara, an emergency number inspired by the Watch the Med AlarmPhone, which has been in operation since 2014.

K N B A O C K W E A A N R D G S

K I N A O C K W E A A N R G S

K B N O C K W E I A N A G S

B K A N D O C K W E I A N A G R S D

B A K N O C K W E I A N G S R D

B A K N O W E I N G S R D

# CULTURE OF DEPORTATION

## SURVIVING THE GERMAN ASYLUM SYSTEM

### SEDA NAIUMAD IN CONVERSATION WITH AINO KORVENSYRJÄ, DAVID JASSEY AND REX OSA

We are sitting in the kitchen with Aino Korvensyrjä and David Jassey, Rex Osa joins us from Nigeria via Skype. Rex has been working as a refugee activist in Germany for thirteen years and he is currently setting up a centre in Nigeria that will connect efforts and urgent issues around the migration struggle in Africa and Europe. Together with Aino he organises the website Culture of Deportation where state violence and injustice in the camps is protocolled and commented on by affected inhabitants and refugee activists, and which publishes critical perspectives on EU border externalisation. Aino unremittingly edits statements, documents court proceedings and researches the German asylum system for her PhD. In collaboration with David, who has experienced the oppressive situation in the camps first hand as a refugee activist and member of the Gambian Integration Committee of Donauwörth, they are attempting to challenge the notorious abuse by security personnel and police in Southern German camps and address the systematic violence and racism unfolding in the asylum system.

SEDA NAIUMAD: We see a rapidly growing, legally and spatially oppressive structure unfolding on Europe's frontiers that systematically criminalises migration, but not all migration. Aino, you mentioned earlier, that the border narrative is shaped very much by a European or German perspective and you pointed to the bigger picture. What does the bigger picture of the EU border regime entail in your opinion? What are the historical formations that it connects to?

AINO KORVENSYRJÄ: Firstly we should understand the internal and the external dimension of the European border regime together. The co-constitution of the external and the internal border has a long history—just as European citizenship was never a purely European affair. It's a misleading narrative, that the European countries' borders are being first drawn nationally, on national territory, and then much later, expanding elsewhere, say to Africa in the form of EU border externalisation. The trajectories and biographies of people who passed through the Southern German "transit camps" or *Anker* centres like Donauwörth or Bamberg during the last years make the persisting coloniality of the border regime evident. Culture of deportation is a useful concept to address this historical formation and its current configuration.

SN: Who started using this term culture of deportation, Rex?

REX OSA: The term culture of deportation was coined out of generational experiences, of refugees and migrants, on a tradition of refugee isolation in the German asylum system. Some older activists from The VOICE Refugee Forum and Karawane Network described the situation as a tradition and culture. My understanding of the culture of deportation became clearer in the wake of the 2010 Caravan Festival in Jena under the slogan "Unite against colonial injustice." The festival aimed to expose the tradition with a call to empower the community of refugees and migrants. From the festival we embarked on the campaign Break Isolation led by The

VOICE. Our mission was to develop strategies of breaking the fear and isolation of refugees in the camps and our challenge was to mobilise unity amongst refugees irrespective of their cultural and national backgrounds, to make them understand that we have one common enemy and that the power of our collective community is solidarity. During this time, the legislation was very strict, like for instance the *Residenzpflicht* (residence obligation), so the refugees were really isolated in the camp. This could only be worsened by conflicts between different nationalities.

So culture of deportation started to develop as a slogan at this stage. We are all faced with the same problem at the end of the day, which is isolation in the camp, criminalisation and deportation. We emphasised that one deportation in the camp is a deportation against every other person and no one knows who may be next.

Following deeper exchange with refugees and resident migrants, the slogan continued to reveal further meanings concerning the migration deals between the EU and Southern countries connected to deportation. The German authorities' obsession concerning passports, even for those with a residency permit, confirms that every foreigner is a potential deportee. Even having German nationality is also not a guarantee as this could be withdrawn at any time based on claims that you are suspected of being connected to a terrorist group.

SN: Why did you decide to call it culture and not system, for example?

RO: If you see the situation as a reproduction of an old tradition then you can as well understand how a culture maintains the status quo. A culture is more foundational to the maintenance of the status quo than a system. The system operates on the cultural frame and facilitates the reproduction of the process. It's a culture because the situation we are faced with does not end with the politics and responsibility of the state. The status quo continues because a larger majority of the society supports it. It is like a mentality of the society, which is a driving force that legitimates the administrative enforcement of

immigration and asylum laws. Even many claiming to be in solidarity do not see anything wrong with deportation, as they are convinced that Germany cannot take everybody.

SN: So it's not just imposed by the administration or government, but it's also accepted in society and affirmed by society?

RO: Yes, everything is happening because the society allows it to happen.

SN: Which then makes it larger than a system basically.

AK: This culture also extends beyond the borders of one society. It is connected to the old mentality that Europeans are entitled to go and stay wherever they want, but as soon as somebody "foreign" comes here, s/he is put under the strictest monitoring, to decide whether s/he is harmful or dangerous and therefore should be "removed" as they say. This is the reasoning still inscribed in the German *Aufenthaltsgesetz* (immigration law). Today both long-distance travelling and control have become much easier by technical means. But the reasoning driving these controls is not new, it is just that today the controls also travel with the formerly colonised populations. In this sense the culture of deportation has a long history, becoming a sort of European "common sense."

SN: The German passport ranks on top in the mobility list, it is basically the most powerful passport in the world. Compared with all other passports, it allows you to travel to the maximum number of countries. And precisely this country has adopted a culture of deportation and systematically prevents mobility for people with other passports. The asymmetry is remarkable.

AK: The Schengen area is in fact operating on a double logic: for the EU citizens it sets up a zone of free circulation, actually extending over the globe, whereas for non-EU citizens it builds external as well as internal borders. For asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers this entails internal mobility restrictions,

controls and internal border zones within the EU—say racial profiling by the German police in traffic hubs, instruments such as the *Residenzpflicht* (residence obligation) and the German asylum camps. These German control mechanisms have by the way been adopted in other places, such as some Swiss cantons now applying the *Residenzpflicht*. At the same time the external EU border often blocks the non-EU citizen's journey before stepping on EU territory, even before crossing any national border, for instance at the German Embassy in their country of origin which refuses to issue a visa and forces her to travel "illegally" if she needs to travel. You could also say the EU external border follows the non-EU citizen anywhere s/he goes, within EU territory but increasingly also for instance on the African continent in the form of border policing. This is at least according to the EU's plan. Regarding border externalisation, the outsourcing and containment agenda particularly in relation to Africa, Germany is pushing for it as a leader within the EU.

The dramatic asymmetry of mobility rights linked to the visa system which you brought up Seda, and the current hierarchy of EU residency permits with the EU citizenship at the top, have their colonial genealogies in the pass laws and the violent processes of painstakingly separating "Whites" from other colours or "citizens" from "natives" and other "non-citizens." European citizenship as a process of the sorting out and disenfranchisement of the "racially inferior" subject has been time after time underscored by the movements denouncing the culture of deportation, such as The VOICE Refugee Forum and African grassroots networks.

RO: Critics can say that every country exercises this kind of control of who can be here and who cannot to be here. We have to look at the particular way Germany manages this: what access do you have to get into the system? In other countries even within the European Union, you have different possibilities to get into the system, to regularise your stay. But in Germany there is barely any way into the system besides the asylum process. If an undocumented migrant is

controlled by the police on the train or elsewhere, s/he is immediately taken into police custody and taken through the criminalising German documentation process, including detention, interrogation, fingerprinting and deportation, or otherwise referred to the asylum process if the deportation could not be enforced. Asylum in this sense appears as a trap to facilitate the control and criminalisation of unwanted foreigners as long as they are within the territory.

By entering the asylum process, you are in a sort of entrapment that targets you with deportation because your prior undocumented status confirmed through police control stigmatises you so to say as an economic migrant. In that situation how can you defend your presence within German territory during an asylum procedure? You are put into the asylum system where you are soon pushed into the *Duldung* status (suspension of deportation, literally toleration) based on prejudice and doubt of your asylum claim.

AK: Germany has crystallised this use of asylum in a way other European countries didn't, at least not until 2015. After that we see a general "asylumisation" of migration control across the European Union. Since the 1990s the EU has of course clearly connected asylum with the control of irregular migration. But the scale on which Germany has produced "bogus asylum seekers" or "economic migrants," that is, "irregular migrants" through its asylum system seems really remarkable. Already in 1973 when work migration was stopped, asylum became one of the few remaining pathways to enter Germany for non-Europeans. Most of the asylum seekers and de facto refugees were at the time in the country with a *Duldung*. In the 1990s the number of "tolerated" would sometimes reach half a million at a time. Today this tradition continues.

What Rex just described there, a sort of *Abschiebekultur* or *Rückführungskultur*, is a counterpart of the *Willkommenskultur*. The much celebrated "welcome culture" has promoted Germany as a very refugee-friendly, refugee welcoming country. But the German asylum system is also effectively illegalising and

criminalising the mobility of people from the former colonies of Europe and areas under European domination today. The asylum system is the place where these people are forced when they enter the country, providing also the mechanism of their rejection and deportation. We need the critical counter-concept of culture of deportation to expose this dimension behind the German "refugees welcome" image.

SN: The culture of deportation seems to produce a common understanding, that a certain type of migration or mobility is by default illegal while another is natural. It produces a "common sense" about illegality which is then backed by passing certain laws, like for example the Dublin regulations.

DAVID JASSEY: By this concept one country or continent aims to sort out and prioritise its own people and economy while denying others freedom of movement and freedom of trade, core ideas of globalisation. This is how we can understand the way the German government considers itself as a victim of incoming migrants grabbing the natives' property and resources, while instead, it is in fact certain government institutions who are committing crimes.

AK: The discourse on so-called asylum fraud is a good example. It suggests that people come to Germany to "cheat our system" and to "take our money," benefits and whatever. The state is staged as a victim and the people on the move as criminals and illegal aliens who threaten national security, the well-being of the state and so on.

DJ: Exactly. We should not forget that colonisation was simply supremacy in all aspects of life: economy, knowledge, life standards, freedom of movement, power over world issues etc. Now we should ask this ideology of globalisation, whether it is applicable to all countries and continents or is it just for Europeans and Americans? If it is just for them, then there is no freedom of movement or trade, but rather "a plot of convenience" for Europe and America to extract what they need from other continents. In order to

facilitate this, the globalisation ideology has to be regulated for the few.

And to continue with how dangerous trade can be: there is hardly an African country manufacturing weapons, yet Africa is today packed with the most recent and dangerous weapons other than nuclear weapons. For instance, think of the mass of weapons and drones showing up in Libya in recent years. We know that the French government has tripled their weapons trade with the Libyan government after Gaddafi while also supplying the rebels with weapons.

However it is the refugee issue that is placed in the spotlight of the media, reporting that they are coming to victimise us, these dangerous and aggressive criminals. They make the whole public hate the refugees.

Curiously, at the same time some countries have portrayed themselves in the international media as if they really welcome refugees, even if the human rights and mobility-right protections are totally missing. Simply put, refugees are not really welcomed anywhere.

## MOVEMENT OF GOODS—MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE

SN: I was just thinking as you spoke, that Niger is one of the places that is now becoming militarised by France and Germany and the EU is outsourcing the control of the external European border there. At the same time Niger provides seventy percent of the uranium used in France's nuclear power stations. So while the uranium travels to Europe, the people are stopped or illegalised. Similar legal patterns exist with countries where gold or coltan is extracted.

AK: Definitely, there is an illicit movement or a forced movement of raw materials between continents. And of European agricultural products, like powdered milk, wheat, tomatoes etc. that are massively migrating to Africa, we might say illegally, even if they are protected by the so-called free trade agreements blackmailed by Europe. These products

are causing a lot of harm in Africa, by destroying local agricultures and ultimately whole economies and thereby driving people to migrate, from the villages to the city, from there to neighbouring countries and to Europe. Thinking of the late 19th century Scramble for Africa it is of course not new that Europe wants to control African resources and the labour force. What we are seeing is a new configuration, perhaps more complex, with China and other actors involved too.

SN: So if we speak of a culture of deportation, we really have to consider all of this as part of it?

RO: I think so. When speaking about the culture of deportation we need to look beyond the frame of Germany.

AK: It is very much a European issue, concerning European integration. As was the management of African resources in the frame of "Eurafrica" after the Second World War, when European powers realised it's actually much more practical to manage them through formal independence. This project was a collective European enterprise, as the direct colonisation in many ways had been. It was not merely a German or a French interest. Even today, with all the new member states, the European control of African resources is constructed as being in the common European interest.

SN: What do you think about the Gambian oil negotiations at the moment, David?

DJ: I share the critical views of many of my fellow Gambians and the former president about the way EU and American oil companies were scrambling to be given the contract to extract from the newly found oil wells in The Gambia. We thought of the oil pipeline spillages in Nigeria which destroyed a lot of farmland and the US-lead NATO attack and subsequent armed struggle in Libya. For us The Gambia is so small and cannot risk these catastrophes. Our former president was of the opinion that if the Gambian oil is to be drilled, the shares between the drilling company and

the Gambian state must be fifty-fifty, and not seventy-thirty as was offered. But with the present Gambian government, all those hopes of resisting cheap offers from oil companies became mere fantasy. Instead the SNE-FAR Ltd will now be drilling one million barrels of oil per day with a percentage of eighty-twenty. Multiply that by 365 days and you can forecast future physical danger both for the landscape and in terms of power struggles. What will be our gain on this mineral resource? Nothing but pain. Never mind the environmental assessment safety studies that have been carried out. Few, if any, European or American companies really care about the environmental repercussions in the aftermath of their businesses in Africa. Clear examples of this are the American giant Shell in Nigeria and the European gold mining firms in Congo and Ghana.

## EXTERNALISATION, LAWS, POLICING AND NGOS IN AFRICA

SN: Europe seems to hold a power of definition over what is legal and what is illegal. How is it using this power to control African mobility?

AK: Today the EU is imposing, with carrots and sticks, national immigration laws and policies on African countries, even if border control is supposed to be a core area of national sovereignty. It aims to prevent Africans from migrating to Europe and to promote forced migration back to Africa. In this context law is a powerful instrument of state violence and coercion, producing illegalised mobility on an intercontinental scale. Also many other European or European-dominated organisations such as the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) or the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, a German society for international cooperation) are involved in the preparation of said laws and policies for Africans as well as in carrying them out. The situation is reminiscent of how the club of sovereign states used to go to Africa, armed with international law, to take

the lands, rights and resources of people not considered to be sovereign.

DJ: These organisations represent European and American interests in Africa in the name of assisting growth and development. Their aid is always conditional. Unfortunately as the NGOs are playing their game, they are also bringing more money for African governments, many of which are then ready to accept their conditions. I don't know how well they understand that these policies are harming their countries.

SN: Which organisation is responsible for the negotiations with African governments for agreements to take back refugees?

RO: There are always negotiations either on a governmental level or through civil society collaboration with NGOs that project the interests of Europe. Such deceptive rhetoric on fighting the root causes of migration or illegal migration are targeting "human trafficking" to cover up awareness of EU responsibility. This multifaceted approach is geared at creating loopholes for corrupt collaboration, with lures of development aid to ensure African governments endorsement of EU border control beyond the European shores to keep migrants and refugees in their countries of origin.

With IOM as a major participant in this manipulation, deals are facilitated between both state and non-state actors. The GIZ is actively engaged in ensuring Germany's specific interests alongside many other organisations which include welfare and charity organisations connected with the churches. These deceptive missions are executed in different project phases simultaneously.

In recent negotiations between the Nigerian and German government representatives in Abuja, the host government maintained a strong position against Germany's plot to bypass the Nigerian immigration attaché in Germany and enforce massive deportations of Black Africans. According to the German plan, rejected asylum seekers who are suspected to be Nigerians could then be profiled and identified at a Nigerian airport rather than by Nigerian officials in Germany as before. The Germans'

promise to return those who could not be identified as Nigerians back to Germany was an obvious deception.

After losing in that bargain with the Nigerian federal government, the German government still continued with a further attempt to lobby stooge state governments to sign deceptive memorandums of understanding to create loopholes to undermine the position of the federal government in deportation practices. This tradition of divide and rule was once again evident as the Edo state government, hoping for more European funding, declared its readiness to develop its own migration legislation to challenge the federal government's stand.

SN: European interests always seem to come in the disguise of aid and help?

RO: Yes, these are all lures to further exploit the society both physically and mentally. The actual mission of the EU in the countries of origin of refugees like Nigeria is to discourage people from migrating. Media propaganda on deaths in the Mediterranean and miseries during the journey through the desert have become the order of the day. With human traffickers blamed as exclusively responsible for these problems, the issue of root causes and responsibility for the forced migration trend are swept under the carpet. All projects involving migration in refugee-sending countries are now directed at informing people to explore unrealistic legal paths to "safe, orderly and regular" migration. However, visa possibilities are continuously shrinking and local livelihoods are being destroyed by the massive exploitation and unjust domination of a global market empowered by neoliberal policies.

Slogans like "Stopping hardships and horrors in the desert" play a very symbolic role in this area. These are saying, "We are only trying to stop the death in the Mediterranean and in the desert, so let us stop illegal migration." So that is the whole business now. The migration industry has now become the biggest business in Nigeria. European NGOs, activists, researchers and other migration practitioners are trooping into the country with a big interest in Edo State, as it is the hub of migration. Billions

are being disbursed to discourage people from migrating to Europe. We must now question the credibility of the international organisations like IOM and the agencies. There can be no sitting on the fence. One is either for or against the right to freedom of movement.

Africa does not in fact need aid because it's a continent endowed with all that the world needs for its survival. The root causes for the ongoing forced migration must be critically brought to the discussion table rather than in these disguises of development aid, EU-championed migration management or the smokescreen of creating pathways for "safe, orderly and regular" migration. It should be clear that all the efforts of the past years to reinforce border controls have only created more deaths at the borders of the EU rather than stopping the drive to migrate. So long as the neoliberal greed of the EU continues to induce poverty, hunger, violence and displacement, people are bound to search for security and dignity anywhere in the world.

AK: EU influence on these many levels is evident when European states are for instance funding so-called civil society actors or migration research institutes in West African countries. The view of African civil society or of independent academic specialists on the new migration policies becomes questionable because of the implicit and explicit conditions of the external funding. Governments, but also research and civil society engagement, are lobbied and shaped by European actors to construct a "national interest."

SN: European governments or organisations have also pushed on a concrete level to introduce biometric passports and passport checks within Africa. Can you talk about this?

RO: A lot of efforts has been made to facilitate data exchange as part of the EU's migration control mechanism. A practical example is the biometric passport conditions imposed on African countries. Why must I give my fingerprints at every point of entry to my home country, even when I travel within the Economic Union of West African States (ECOWAS). The EU has continually exerted

pressure to destroy the zone of free mobility constructed within the ECOWAS. The EU has only been able to accomplish this through engaging individual ECOWAS countries in bilateral agreements to trigger national border policing in contradiction with regional integration in the ECOWAS. This policing is now operating on the presumption that every migrant crossing the border must be heading towards Europe.

AK: In 2015 the EU used the "refugee crisis" as an excuse to accelerate its border externalisation agenda in Africa. At the Valletta Summit held with African states in Malta in November 2015 it introduced the Emergency Trust Fund with which it has been funding for instance national biometric systems for African countries. The EU aims to close the "deportation gap," which refers to people who have been issued a deportation order, but who are still in the territory. Both the EU Commission and Germany—particularly the Federal and State Ministries of the Interior—have framed this as a major problem. Deportation to the country of origin is not always so easy, as a passport or reliable identification is needed. And most peoples' only way to move towards Europe is by not having a passport or by hiding it. To increase the control and to complete the "new pass laws," the authorities want to fix people's identities in biometric databases already in the countries of origin, from where the data could possibly be quickly retrieved for deportation. Yet certainly resistance and new ways to evade control will emerge. Also, African states have resisted plans for an EU *laissez-passer*, a travel certificate issued by any EU member state for an African deportee. This plan is yet another infringement on African states' sovereignty, as I was saying before.

The Emergency Trust Fund also finances a lot of policing operations in Africa. Europe is supervising those countries to better police their borders so that migrants will not reach Europe, which is seriously also affecting intra-African mobility.

## EUROPE'S INTERIOR BORDER REGIMES, *LAGER*, LEGAL VIOLENCE

SN: Let's come back to what happens inside of Europe and to those people who have against all odds successfully made their journey here and are now in Germany or another European country.

How does the legal system operate in conjunction with the camp system? As we heard before the main objective for the EU seems to be to prevent integration and deport people as soon as possible. In the camps contact with civil society or solidarity networks is stifled and refugees don't have access to information or legal advice other than what is provided by the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF, Federal Asylum Administration). So-called *Anker* centres are the most recent tools of isolating refugees and restricting their movement and rights. But they also seem a stepping stone in the systematic criminalisation of migration.

RO: Based on past decades experience it is easy to understand the current politics of the *Anker* centres and other reproductions of the tradition. These are only deceits with name changes aimed at creating distractions of the public. The operating mechanism is dependent on the racist status quo. The difference in the situation between isolating either one hundred or up to 2000 persons in camps is perhaps only that more chaos and possible resistance can follow, as we have seen recently in the cases of Ellwangen, Donauwörth and others. The agenda is evil as always, there is still no true integration in this system. An integration policy that undermines our active participation is racist and colonial. The status quo defends that racist position—there can be no room for multiculturalism. The tradition of Germany must be maintained at any cost.

AK: I also think that in the last three years, during the so-called crisis, the narrative

of the illegal, criminal Black or Brown asylum seeker, enemy of the German society or state has really sort of gone viral and also consolidated. This discursive criminalisation finds its counterpart in the policies, in the forms of state violence and in extralegal practices. One example is the large scale police raids in Southern German asylum camps in 2017 and 2018 that took a specific form and were repeated over and over again as a mediatised spectacle.

SN: You have been using the term legal violence to describe certain procedures. Can you explain what you mean by legal violence?

AK: Legal violence is supposedly justified violence effected by and through the law, legitimised and naturalised by the law. The US sociologists Menjivar and Abrego have used the concept to refer to the effects of punitive immigration laws, enforcement actions, and the stigmatisation of migrants, which taken together, harm them both in the long and the short term. The criminalisation of migration is a key logic here. In a violent operation the legal framework turns people who use their mobility rights into “illegal aliens,” suspicious guests or intruders. The German asylum system forces most non-EU migration into the asylum system, while at the same time denying the possibility of asylum status for most applicants. Particularly in the so-called *Anker* centres, the applicants are categorised along predetermined asylum recognition rates into those with and those supposedly without a “perspective to stay.” The latter are labelled as cheaters and fraudsters, and their basic rights are curtailed: they are banned from working, schooling and health care, get no pocket money, cannot leave the city limits and are also otherwise deprived of even the minimum of personal autonomy, like the possibility to cook or to receive guests. Whether walking the street or sleeping in their beds, they are exposed to criminalisation and police and security guard violence.

Many dimensions of legal violence—the structural, symbolic, directly physical and discursive—are manifested in the way the *Duldung* is managed and policed in discretionary spaces or grey areas of administrative power,

like when somebody is accused of breaching his or her *Mitwirkungspflicht* (obligation to cooperate) and is subjected to sanctions. To use Walter Benjamin’s concept, these are in fact spaces of a law-making violence, they are not merely about law enforcement.

I know that many people would object to my argument of law as a tool of violence, and for good reason. Many anti-racists and people negatively affected by racism are making demands within or towards the legal system to claim their rights. That is mostly very necessary. But it is always a double situation, involving the master’s tools and the question, what can you really achieve with them.

SN: There was a similar discussion in the tribunal Unraveling the NSU Complex, a grassroots movement to publicly denounce the NSU Complex and the institutional and structural racism that prevented its exposure, a condition that causes additional suffering for the families of the victims to this day. The families of the victims demanded justice in the court and the movement supported them in this effort. Yet, as we have seen during the NSU trial and at the verdict in July 2018: the court was not the place where the families got justice. As this was sadly predictable, the tribunal sought to develop other forms of pushing for justice and organised a people’s tribunal and a counter forensic investigation. Frederick Douglass said that nothing comes without struggle. You’re never given justice and you always have to fight for it.

DJ: I agree with your points. I remember the time as we were negotiating with the authorities in the camp, they refused all our demands as being either against EU law or against German law. What was in place in and around the camp was already considered standard by the authorities, so we need not ask for anything. Their response was also standard: “EU laws say so” or “German law says that.” In practice they were not ready to improve the conditions in the *Lagers* in any way.

SN: After the big police raids in the camps of Donauwörth and especially the spectacular raid in Ellwangen in early 2018, the

second half of 2018 saw mayor police attacks in the *Anker* camps in Bavaria almost on a weekly basis, in Bamberg, in Stephansposching near Deggendorf, in Fürstenfeldbrück. They have become like a new norm: heavily armed police enter the camps sometimes including support by *Sondereinsatzkommandos* (SEK), dogs and helicopters, smash the doors, violate, beat and arrest people. The reasons often seem arbitrary like identifying camp residents, controlling fire regulations, checking the rooms for dangerous objects, basically reasons that don’t justify the presence of 500 heavily armed police. In Fürstenfeldbrück a water cooker and CD player were confiscated, in a later raid in Donauwörth a kitchen knife. In the course of these raids, basic constitutional rights like the right to assembly, the right to voice your opinion, the right to privacy in your room are suspended. Often, the raids seem to be a punishment for organising or for protests in any form. Could we go through some of the concrete things that happened in the camps? For instance, what happened in Donauwörth earlier this year?

DJ: We experienced one of these police raids in March 2018. The background is that since November 2017 we got organised in the Donauwörth camp as the Gambian Integration Committee. We were around 350 Gambian refugees who were facing a lot of trouble in the camp as Black Africans, ranging from security aggression to discrimination. Being the majority among the nationalities in the camp, we Gambians thought it was wise to focus on integrating ourselves in German society instead of lamenting on the situation.

We were new to each other and started with informal gatherings which included games and dancing. Then we started holding weekly meetings on Thursdays. We decided that we would not have leaders, but that all 350 Gambians were part of the integration committee. We selected an executive which was to coordinate meetings and to represent the committee externally.

Our two main objectives were first to facilitate our integration into German society, by visiting schools and kindergartens and organising a discussion with the adults and elderly at the City Hall and offering community

service, like cleaning public places. Secondly we wanted to negotiate with the authorities to solve our problems and channel our complaints. We wrote letters to the government representatives in the camp, requesting solutions for basic issues: we needed our pocket money back after it had been blocked, equal treatment by the camp workers of Black people—Gambians, Senegalese, Nigerians, Ethiopians, etc—and those of fairer complexion—like Turkish, Syrians, Pakistanis, Georgians. We also demanded that the police should stop controlling and searching our school-going colleagues who were terrorised by these controls at the train station. We demanded that the foreigners’ office stop crossing our *Ausweis* (ID card) out with a red line and writing *ungültig* (invalid) on it. And we demanded access to health care for our sick colleagues.

By February none of these had been met. On the 12th of February 2018, The Gambian Integration Committee which was providing services within the camp like cleaning, kitchen work, security and laundry for eighty cents per hour pay, decided to stop working and demanded a response to their requests. The government representative in the camp turned the executive back, which had been sent to negotiate. Following an incident in the canteen during the lunch break, as a camp worker had tried to tape us without our permission, we—the entire Gambian group—decided to go back to Italy. We were fed up with security beating us, racist police controls, racist discrimination within the camp, and refusal to treat our sick colleagues.

So really excited, we packed our bags and left the camp. It was snowing but we were shouting with joy. But on reaching the Bahnhof, we encountered police blocking it, and this was the only way we knew out of Donauwörth. It was at this very moment we realised that the camp had a director. He showed up, and persuaded us to go back to the camp and negotiated. He promised to facilitate solving the problems. Yet on the following day, in a meeting in the camp, the director denied all the promises he had made the previous day at the train station. We then intensified the negotiations with all relevant authorities in and outside the camp and requested that the director and the police

representative attend those meetings. At the same time the local media was busy writing false information about what happened at the Donauwörth train station.

As none of our demands had been met, on the 7th of March 2018, we went on strike again to show our dismay, so we stopped working and schooling. This continued until the 14th of March 2018. That night at around three a.m., police officers came to take a Gambian individual to be deported. He was not found in his room, so the police searched room to room, waking many refugees up. Later the police drove away and claimed that the refugees had prevented the deportation.

At around two p.m. the same day, we saw a line of about sixty police cars driving into the camp, at their sides officers running side by side while another group of police officers ran to secure the camp's fence. The police went to the buildings housing single men of all nationalities. They wore body armour and were armed with tear gas, pistols, long batons, metal and plastic handcuffs, pepper spray, ropes, knives and dogs. We were scared but at the same time we wanted to know why they were in the camp. The answer from the police was pepper spray in our faces to the extent that one of our colleagues collapsed and was taken to hospital. During the four hour long operation thirty-two of our colleagues were arrested, but the deportee of the night before was not found. Two were released that evening and thirty were kept behind bars for two months.

SN: The raid targeted just one nationality or several?

DJ: All those arrested were members of the Gambian Integration Committee, even if during that night's deportation attempt, when the fire alarm went off, many different nationals living in that building came running, seeking safety. But later it was claimed that it was the Gambians who prevented the deportation.

They attacked us because we were stubbornly demanding our basic rights, but also, we were very objective and refused to accept any dubious explanation or practice. We wanted a complete solution to our problems. At one

point, The Gambian Integration Committee fired its first spokesperson for compromising his position through taking bribes. In another instance, a Gambian colleague was discovered recording our meeting on his smartphone, and was expelled from the meeting. We were serious.

SN: Would you say that the arrested colleagues were punished for voicing their needs or demands, for being part of the Gambian Integration Committee?

DJ: Sure, this was a punishment for demanding our basic rights, but also for refusing the eighty cent jobs which relieved them from hiring new staff in the camp. They criminalised us with the accusation of having "prevented a deportation." But this is really dubious: how did we prevent deportation when there was nobody to be deported?

A day after the police attack, the Bavarian Interior Minister Mr. Herrmann, announced his visit to the Donauwörth camp. We were glad hearing that announcement because for us, it was an opportunity to narrate our story of the incident, instead of the already circulated false police report. However, to our dismay, we learned that, Mr. Herrmann gave an order that he does not want to meet Blacks. Then, we decided to stay indoors just to avoid him.

After the arrest of our thirty colleagues we started to network better with refugees from other areas, holding meetings in Munich. We held a demonstration in Munich on the 26th of March 2018 and another one on the 29th in Donauwörth demanding the release of our colleagues and that the German government should give us hope instead of handcuffs. The executive gave many interviews to different media, but to our disappointment, our statements were always changed. We thus stopped giving interviews.

We tried to locate and visit our imprisoned colleagues. In response, the police claimed that many of them had been transferred to other prisons and they had no idea where or which prisons they might have been taken to. After two months they started releasing them from pre-trial custody. Meanwhile, some of our colleagues had already been deported from prison to Italy. The released colleagues were sent

to smaller camps in remote places, from where some of them were later deported. Most of them got charges for *Landfriedensbruch* (breach of the peace). They were manipulated to agree to pay the fines. Only a few were then able to make an appeal against those charges, as they came to understand what they had signed with the assistance of activist supporters. The ridiculous first hearing was on the 7th of November, and our two colleagues defended themselves. The judge gave a generalised judgement based on general preventive considerations and not the cases at hand.

The police attack, intensified deportations thereafter and the constant presence of police in the camp and their intimidation outside the camp frightened many refugees. Many left the camp, while others were deported. In the end, very few Gambians remained. Executive members were threatened with deportation orders and they had to go on the run. This fear factor led to even the active members focusing on their own cases. Such strategy is effective against any self-organised refugee group.

In Bamberg something similar happened. There was a very vibrant group of refugees who were supporting networking between camps. But that camp has been also the most notorious for security mishandling the refugees and constant police raids.

## DANGEROUSNESS, *BLEIBEPERSPEKTIVE*, *GASTRECHT*

SN: Security and police often seem to work together in punishing, intimidating and criminalising those who they see as trouble-makers, not only in Donauwörth.

AK: The large "transit camp" in Bamberg, today an *AnKER* camp, is a good example of this, as David mentioned. There, in the summer of 2017 the security company set up a so-called *Sonderteam* (special team) which systematically provoked and violently attacked particularly Black African asylum seekers. When the police arrived at the scene

of the aggression, they often arrested the victim or victims, who in many cases then got criminalised by the local court with orders of summary punishment for supposedly having attacked the guards. The victimised asylum seekers stand practically no chance to win in court, even if they would manage to challenge their unjust penalties at the Bamberg local court, as some did. Many victims have meanwhile escaped from Bamberg to other European countries. It has been very difficult to raise the issue in the media, due to the difference in credibility the media sees between the security apparatus and the refugees. This system is still in place to this day in Bamberg. The camp management is aware of what is going on, but their interest seems not to be to stop the violence, as they want to push the residents to self-deport by whatever means. The security company still holds the contract. However many employees of the security service had to leave, after speaking up or just knowing too much.

In Bavaria the *Polizeiaufgabengesetz* (PAG police law) since 2017 declares all asylum camps as "dangerous places." This authorises the police to enter any time and perform ID controls and searches without further authorisation. This law also enables the massive police raids. But in fact many state actors and external personnel are involved in the production of danger or dangerousness in these isolation camps besides the police: the security guards, the camp personnel, the foreigners' offices, courts and the media. We saw very clearly how this machinery works, when trying to challenge the security guard violence in Bamberg and also in the Donauwörth case, when we all went to court together in Augsburg last November.

What you, David, have been resisting there with your colleagues are policies legitimated with seemingly neutral legal and administrative concepts like *Bleibeperspektive* and safe countries of origin, the Dublin regulations and the *Duldung*, all of them just fig-leaves for racism. Every time I hear you telling the story of Donauwörth, I have to think of this contortion of justice. As soon as you don't accept what is being done to you in the name of these unjust concepts, it is you who will be labelled as dangerous and as an intolerable security risk,

hence you should be controlled and punished even more.

SN: What is the situation now? What happened to the people who were arrested in Donauwörth?

DJ: The police tactics have had a big psychological effect. And they won because our organisation was dismantled by fear and by the transfers of active members to remote villages in Bavaria. Some left to other EU countries, many were deported to Italy. The situation is not easy as most of them were deported without any cash and no Italian address. So they spent time living on the street, waiting for something to come up.

AK: Some of the Gambians did end up picking fruit and vegetables in Italy, one person also in Spain where he moved from Italy as he could not survive there on the street. In general, asylum seekers who get deported to Italy or self-deport from the German camps to Spain are doing that kind of occasional field work, whose products may well land in German supermarkets.

DJ: Many of our colleagues are also still here in Germany, but they're really afraid to be active now because they were also threatened with deportation, and they have to stay away from the camp, and were kicked out of the system and now they really need support to get back in the system again.

SN: With Dublin and *Duldung* we see a system of legal means that is so complex and multi-layered that it's difficult to understand. And without knowing the system, you're basically exposed to its violence, and you can't really do much about it. And this seems to be intentional. Aino, David, what role do Dublin and *Duldung* play in the criminalisation of specific refugees?

AK: Sometimes people living in the new Bavarian isolation camps, who have spent years in Germany under deportation threat, pose me the question of what the difference is between Dublin and *Duldung*. Such is the

extent to which they have been isolated from any information sources on the law. Yet they understand the material effects of those two much better than me.

For the legal system, in its own terms, Dublin and *Duldung* are two very different things: Dublin III is a regulation in EU law which together with the EURODAC fingerprint database determines which member state is responsible for the asylum claim. Usually it is the first state where the person enters EU territory in the South or East. Dublin was in fact to a large extent a German project, designed to protect the North of Europe from asylum seekers cum "irregular" migrants. *Duldung* on the other hand is a German administrative act of suspending a person's deportation for a certain time period, in case of an obstacle, such as not having a passport or in case of illness.

Therefore it is remarkable that asylum seekers living in the German camps tend to use Dublin and *Duldung* interchangeably. As a lived situation, Dublin and *Duldung* are often referring to the same experience of being under threat of constant deportation and exposed to criminalisation through different means. And surely, they can overlap: you "have Dublin" when the German asylum administration has sent you a letter saying that another member state is responsible for your application, and therefore, any night they might come to take you there. For African people in *Anker* camps it is usually Italy. While "having Dublin" you might also be issued a *Duldung*, a piece of paper crossed over with a red line. Or you might get nothing, as nowadays particularly foreigners' offices in the *Anker* camps prefer to leave people wholly undocumented. In the other scenario, where you have undergone the asylum procedure in Germany and it has decided negatively on your asylum application, adding an enforceable deportation order, you might get a *Duldung*, if there is some obstacle to your deportation, like not having a passport. Yet here also you might get nothing these days, that is, even no *Duldung*, which itself is not much of anything. It is not a residency permit, just a paper saying you are still here though you should not be.

DJ: Refugees who are Dublin cases are actually quite helpless. And regarding the German police, in our experience Dublin is the first point of criminalising refugees. In our camp, we weren't given the *Duldung* ID in the Dublin situation. The foreigners' office would just mark per hand a red line, something that looks like a Nike sign across refugees' *Ausweis* (ID card) or write *ungültig* (invalid) with a red marker. This was very scary to us as refugees as it made it obvious that your application had been rejected and you were expected to leave the country or that you had received a Dublin rejection from BAMF (Federal Asylum Administration). This then gave the police the possibility of humiliating these refugees with controls in public, without caring much about the law, performing prolonged body searches and posing questions like, "Why aren't you going back to Italy?" Or better still, "Why can't you go back to your country?"

This would often happen as our colleagues went to school. This was in fact one of our demands as the Gambian Integration Committee in the Donauwörth camp, provoked by these maltreatments in public by the police, that the foreigners' office in Donauwörth should not to mark our ID's in such a way, but rather, these refugees should be provided with another document which defines their status. Because the *Ausweis* is the only valid legal document we have in this country and therefore it should not be interfered with.

SN: When the judge at the court in Augsburg asked the security guards about the Donauwörth night, she focused her questions towards security guard and police witnesses on their feelings: "How did you feel? Were you scared? Did you feel that it was dangerous?" The assessment of whether a group of fifty people gathering in the yard of the camp, being Black and also voicing their opinions is a threat, was based on the emotional state of the security personnel. There is a historical dimension to perceiving the mere presence of a Black body as dangerous from the White perspective. The judge did not seem aware of the racist legacy of this very perception, quite on the contrary she helped reproduce it.

AK: Also in her verdict the judge referred to the Gambians as guests who should behave accordingly and if not, deserve punishment. The idea of the foreigner as a guest who should behave belongs to the German legal tradition and is at the core of the culture of deportation: your presence here is only conditional and probational, even a sort of mercy which might end anytime. It is not even so much about what you do but very much also about who you are, or rather, how you are seen.

SN: In this narrative, you are already seen as a threat or as a danger merely because you have entered Europe. You have already done something illegal: coming here. So anything you might do or intend is already questionable.

AK: The Algerian sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad, argued that for the nation-state migration is per se criminal and a disorder. When the nation state is thinking about itself as a state, as a bordered entity, it is also always thinking about migration as a problem. Does a territorial nation-state even exist prior to cross-border mobility? They kind of constitute each other. We are talking about a historical, European or colonial construct. This is perhaps a bit philosophical, but also for me an important political point because, normally, border control tends to be naturalised as a self-evident duty of a sovereign nation-state. But perhaps there is just violence against a perceived other which gets legitimated as an existing order of the nation-state. For the one put into the place of disorder this logic means a double criminalisation, in case s/he happens to draw attention again after the original "crime" of arrival.

RO: This whole process of the criminalisation starts with the registration for asylum. As an asylum applicant you are presumed to be an "economic migrant" coming to feed on Germany's social welfare. The asylum hearing becomes a sort of moral responsibility, the so-called due process meant to legitimate a prior prejudice. Rather than your claims being heard, you experience a tribunal-like situation where you are only expected to affirm that German prejudice of having illegally entered

the EU territory. Case officers are often arrogant and abusive, provoking asylum seekers and hindering them from clarifying their situation. Resistance in such cases could be a reason for rejection based on claims of failed cooperation. It would be labelled as a strategy to defend a lie.

After the hearing, a written decision is expected and the time frame could vary from days to many years. With a positive decision, there are many categories of acceptance under different paragraphs with different rights and privileges. With a negative decision, you have an option to appeal at the administrative court within your jurisdiction. There are also different levels of rejection but the further appeal process continues with the traditional prejudice and the subsequent rejection by the administrative court.

At this stage the asylum seeker is delivered from the asylum procedure to the mercy of the local foreigners' office which enforces the *Aufenthaltsgesetz* (immigration law) and issues a *Duldung*. The so-called *Mitwirkungspflicht*, the obligation to collaborate in the process of identifying oneself for deportation is key to the criminalising process with both physical and mental torture. At every renewal of your *Duldung* (toleration), you are informed of your obligation to collaborate in your identification, the *Passpflicht* (passport obligation), and you are then criminalised for the continued refusal to submit a passport without recourse to the conditions that could have been hindering the presentation of your documents. Simply going to the embassy is not considered as complying because in the case you do not obtain a document you are assumed not to have cooperated with your embassy.

Another typical situation is that you are then investigated and interviewed by the police or faced with an invitation to a mobile identification hearing where embassy officials, commissioned by the German authorities, identify persons by their accents or physical appearance, such as facial marks or shape of the head. You could also be taken to court and even sentenced to pay fines or to serve a prison term. All this goes into your file in the foreigners' central register with consequences at different levels. In your police report,

you are presented as having violated the immigration law. If your sentence was more than ninety *Tagessätze* (daily rates) you count as convicted. With that you can be sure of a series of deprivations and possibly also face a situation of brutal expulsion. But even a lower amount of daily rates can bring immigration law consequences for asylum seekers, like refusal of certain residency permits.

AK: The crime of not giving the full information about your identity or not showing your passport is really among the most evil legal contradictions or traps for asylum seekers in Germany. Because you can only come here when you don't reveal your identity. And then you're immediately criminalised.

DJ: Yes, it is a trap. In these camps refugees are like minor convicts, prisoners, yet not seeing themselves as really prisoners. But everything in that asylum camp is controlled, what you eat, how often you go out, how long you stay there, how much money you get, how you should use that money, everything. In some public places for instance, refugees are not allowed in dance clubs.

And there is no private sphere whatsoever. This makes life hard. For example, eight adult refugees are hosted in a room made for one person. In the winter, windows and doors are always closed and the sleeping refugees must share the remaining oxygen in the room for the whole night. If one or two of these refugees are sick with some easily transmitted diseases, the other six or seven refugees are likely to catch the same illness. The health care in all refugee camps here in Germany is very poor. The camp authorities consider sick refugees a burden and therefore practically refuse to treat anyone. If the refugees aren't that lucky and share a room with a thief, then there will always be problems. If one who doesn't smoke shares a room with smokers, he can only use the room for sleeping.

SN: It is also emotionally and mentally a challenge to not have a fight or not go crazy in a cramped room with eight people, right? Isn't this part of a certain strategy of harassment and provocation which, when you happen to

freak out, then enables the whole system to push it back on you, and to punish you even more and say: "See, we told you that they are..."

DJ: "Aggressive and dangerous."

RO: The issue is linked with psychological torture. The fact that you have to always go back to the camp and face the same situation again is horrifying. Even if the refugee camp would be situated within the premises of the German Chancellor's Office with all due attention, the feeling of isolation remains as *always*. Because your life revolves around the *Lager* and its repressive rules and regulation, fear of the yellow envelopes, always expecting the worse, experiencing the deportation of friends and the thoughts of being next. And in the big camps like Ellwangen you are not allowed to be out for more than three days, otherwise you are taken off the list. Your return would mean to register again and getting a new room.

DJ: Actually different camps have different regulations. In Donauwörth, we were only allowed to be out of the camp for twenty-four hours. When you were out longer you would be marked red. Red against a refugee's name means that particular refugee is gone missing and when it is given to the police, it means they should start searching for this refugee. Refugees of course have their own means to overcome the limitation of twenty-four hours, which are quite simple. To use such means is just normal for any human being.

AK: We've been talking about this shift of controls to the local practices, which is both a tradition of German "aliens policy," but also now a stronger trend. This being so, you can never exactly know what is in fact the practice or the law or the rules. In the past, the federal *Residenzpflicht* seemed clearer and was much easier to protest against. Big crowds could be mobilised against this law. Persons living in large reception camps, for instance the *AnKER* camps still have the *Residenzpflicht*. But now there are different sorts of *Residenzpflicht* and special regulations in the *AnKER* camps plus all these different local restrictions from

twenty-four hours to three days. It is more difficult to mobilise people against these, when they treat asylum seekers in very different ways. People also react very differently to these restrictions, some go absent from their camps for many weeks, claiming their mobility rights within Germany while some are afraid of leaving the camp at all.

## HISTORICAL CONTINUITIES, THE GUEST, ARSON ATTACKS, POLICE RAIDS

AK: We seem to keep asking ourselves, are these strategies new, are they old, how are they so? For instance, the current massive police raids and camp politics echo the history of the 1980s and 1990s arson attacks against asylum camps and migrants in Germany, in Mölln, Solingen, Rostock, Lichtenhagen. The recent NSU-Tribunal in Mannheim vividly reminded me of this. The police were then often passively standing aside, granting impunity or excusing the perpetrators. The courts and the media also participated in this dominant formula of racist aggression, just like today.

SN: I see also continuity in the idea of the guest that the judge in the Donauwörth evoked. Germany signed its first "guest worker" contract in 1955. The guest workers were needed to build up Germany and its immense industrial growth after 1950. But thirty years later these people were still seen as guests. They lived in Germany over three decades and gave their labour power, their bodies, their health, their lives, to work in the factories, do hard work on the construction sites and so on. And you still call them guests.

AK: Can Candan's film *Duvalar*, a film about the Turkish communities in Berlin after the fall of the wall, shows how "useful" it can be to frame some elements as "guests" and as the problem because then you don't have to talk about some real problems you're having and of which you should be absolutely talking about. We can see many parallels with today.

B A S E C K U E R I A T Y R D

B S A E C C K U E R A T R Y D

B A C C K E A R D

S E C U R I T Y

B A C C K E A R D

S E B A C C K E R A R D T Y

S E B A C C K E A R I D T Y



Bundesamt  
für Migration  
und Flüchtlinge

Malteser  
**ANKER-Einrichtung**  
Donauwörth



Agentur für Arbeit

6





Besucher  
und Lieferverkehr  
bitte seitlich Halte  
und über das  
Fußgängertor an  
Pforte an

Einfahrt  
Leinhardt-Passtraße  
über Haupttor  
(B29) Richtung Ellwangen

Fahrzeug- und  
Personenkontrolle  
Standort an  
Innenbeleuchtung  
Insassen aussteigen  
Ausweis vorzeigen



Baden-Württemberg  
Regierungspräsidium Stuttgart

Landeserstaufnahmeeinrichtung für Flüchtlinge  
Ellwangen































I NB&CK'G/AHRDT S

I NBASC'K'G/AHRD S

IBNAS'K'GVAHFTS

BIAN'S'K'GVAHTRSD

BANCS'K'GVAHAT'S D

BAIN'S'K'GVAHATASR D

# TUMULT

SURVIVING IN THE RUINOUS RUIN

From the bottom of weakness, loneliness and fear, few of new comers to Ickerweg camp in Osnabrück came together early April this year. The common motivation between them was an urge to step out of negative and passive stand to ACT in togetherness, to intervene our destiny, to SHAPE it. This birth stage was fostered by a group of activists from No Lager Osnabrück and Solidarity city Osnabrück in a very proactive approach of empowering Refugees them self to involve in resistance and develop their own structures and methods of engagement.

We chose with no route the sea and the boats of death, in the middle of the annoyed sea, we stick to hope of dignified life in the north. We thought that when we cross the aggressive waters of the Mediterranean we will land on the “promised land” which will save everyone’s life.

We did not know that we would face the monster of the laws, cement and bureaucracy. We burned our fingers by our fingers to escape the fingerprints ghosts, expulsion and forced deportation.

The fear of police and discharge has become the distinctive feature of our days in Europe

the “promised land.” We live an illegal life, which we did not think before that we, as human beings could be illegal. We live in assembly camps, as we were in the chicken coop, the foxes of the enforced deportation hunt us one by one.

We applied for a new asylum to the forests, nights and the train station to hide from the ghosts of the police and deportation. Our lives future became like the jump in the dark.

With the great solidarity from our supports in No Lager we discovered the secret of the whistle. The whistle of self-organisation, and team action. It became like our symbol of resistance to deportation.

By whistles we managed to stop the foxes enforced deportation from our chicken coop, for more than three months we work in a night shifts to protect our dreams of a simple life and decent no more and no less.

We are growing up our block team to a structured executive committee with strategies, plans and self-managed functions of day to day issues at camp, we addressing wider broad

**of our issues, opening dialogue with authorities and networking with same-interest organisations like Solidarity city movement, and moving between camps to spread the resistance virus, we will make a change only if we stand together.**


**On 12th September we celebrated 100 days of free camp from police oppression, NO-deportation and successfully stopping three attempts of deportation, we celebrated 100 days of night shifts guarded by hope and whistles.**

**We are glad to come today united, to speak our voice loud against Dublin agreement, against racism, sexism and homo/trans-phobia. We'll come united to tell our narrative, the narrative of human struggle to be "legal" and to live a dignified life on this earth.**

Speech by the Executive committee of Sudanese Refugees in Ickerweg, read at We'll Come United demonstration in Berlin 16.9.2017 (quoted from: <http://nolageros.blogspot.eu/2017/10/05/1998/>)









LEGISLATION, ETC., OF PENNSYLVANIA IN REGARD TO


Council against the "tumultuous gatherings of the  
of the towne of Philadelphia,


They were declared to be often "tumultuous" in 1693,  
to be found "cursing, gaming, swearing, and committing many other disorders"  
in 1732; in 1738 and 1741



In 1732, under Mayor Hasel, the City Council  
"taking under Consideration the frequent and tumultuous meetings of the  
especially on Sunday, Gaming, Cursing, Swearing, and committing many other Disorders,  
to the great Terror and Disquiet of the Inhabitants of this city ordered an ordinance to be drawn up against  
such disturbances.

...sit there with  
against the peace and good gov  
milk pails and other things late at night  
ernment of this city Council ordered the place to be cleared "in half an hour after sunset."  
with 39 Lashes





Ellwangen

May, 2018

with 39 Lashes

*"There was a lot of talk about us,  
speaking!"*



What's at stake is fugitive movement in and out of the frame, bar, or whatever externally imposed social logic—a movement of escape, the stealth of the stolen that can be said, since it inheres in every closed circle, to break every enclosure. This fugitive movement is stolen life, and its relation to law is reducible neither to simple interdiction nor bare transgression. Part of what can be attained in this zone of unattainability, to which the eminently attainable ones have been relegated, which they occupy but cannot (and refuse to) own, is some sense of the fugitive law of movement that makes black social life ungovernable, that demands a para-ontological disruption of the supposed connection between explanation and resistance.

Fred Moten, "The Case of Blackness," in: *Criticism*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (spring 2008), p. 179

Fred Moten — When you mentioned that law I kept thinking there is a deep structure of these kind of laws and I remembered when I was reading Du Bois' *Philadelphia Negro*, there is an appendix to the end of the book, in which he actually lists and gives short descriptions of the laws in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that specifically pertained to and had an impact on black life, and one of them was a law I think from 1704, called an anti-tumult law, which outlawed the tumultuous gathering of two or more blacks in the public square on Sundays. And I remember reading it and I kept thinking, why would you do that, why? And first of all what is that? What would it mean to outlaw the gathering of two or more black people?

I think one could argue that it is literally to make blackness against the law. Which is to say in so far as blackness, in so far as being black is a thing that you can only do with others—I don't know that it is possible to be black by oneself in so far as being black or black-being is a necessarily irreducibly social thing, to do that is to simply outlaw blackness. Now why? Why would you outlaw blackness? Well, because two or more gathering together, the tumultuous gathering of two or more in a public square is literally as if they were outlawing the weekly formation of a study group 'cause what would two or more black people be doing in Philadelphia in public in 1704 other than thinking about how to get free? That would be nothing other than the weekly meeting of a liberation study group, right?

So, but it's more than that. There is an interesting formulation in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* when he talks about how he's interested in the regulation of a certain kind of tumultuousness, right, that he wants to understand, to sort of enforce over what he calls the tumultuous derangement of the imagination. This outlawing of tumult is nothing other than the attempt to form a very specific and restrictive understanding of what it is to be a person. This restriction of the imagination where what one understands most fundamentally is that the imagination is again itself always involved in this project of liberation. This is about a very specific way of world making: we want to make a world in which this particular modality of social existence is outlawed. And let's say that we can call that a certain kind of normative geography. ... I've been really interested in topology, I've been trying to study math even though I can't really do it for a long time. I met this really interesting great Columbian mathematician named Fernando Zalamea who has written really interesting books about topology. Let's say a general kind of definition of topology would be how space is preserved under duress, under conditions of folding and crumpling and incursion. So let's say there is a black topological existence that is all about the making and the preservation of space under duress. ... And if anything it is a practice of joy that at the same time is a mobilisation of joy in the interest of its own self protection. The only way to protect joy is by practicing it and I think it is these fundamental hallmarks of black social life and how they manifest themselves, and it seems to me again in ways that would link to indigenous forms of life in that it is really all about figuring out a way to walk lightly on the earth.

TUMULT

Robin D.G. Kelley — ... The key word I took from Katherine's McKittrick's interrogation is JOY ... because historically so many uprisings, planned or unplanned, often center around a moment of collective joy, of seizing public space as a social act, as an insurgency, not for the sake of bringing down an order, but for the sake of claiming the space we're talking about. A long time ago, I researched resistance on buses in segregation-era Birmingham, Alabama. We tend to think of black people who refuse to give up their seat to whites doing so in defense of their dignity. That's true, but often times people were arrested for being boisterous, or "cutting up" (laughing, making jokes, using profanity) in the back of the bus. Black bus riders making all this noise were basically seizing space. The placards separating the "whites-only" front from the "blacks-only" back of the bus could not segregate voices, could not stop sound, could not regulate the way that black people occupied the buses and expressed joy. They weren't back there giving dissertations! Sometimes they were "playing the dozens" (humor based on clever insults), often at white people's expense, and doing so in moments of danger. Systems of state surveillance—whether during slavery or post slavery—were always active at surveilling black and brown and indigenous bodies and even white working class bodies. Scholars like George Rudé and Jacques Rancière and others, a long time ago, showed us how working-class rebellions as expressions of bodily freedom and joy were a significant threat to the social order and required surveillance and state repression, especially with respect to women's bodies.

Now in terms of geographies, my daughter Elleza Kelley, a graduate student at Columbia University, has written on what she calls *counter mapping*. She says we've inherited this framework in which mapping is seen as an imperial project—the construction of borders, landmarks, zoning, places marked for the purpose of surveillance—but that black people have created forms of counter mapping, maps of freedom, that offer insurgent routes in the crooked lines, these beautiful crooked lines, and she draws this from Toni Morrison's work. So one of the things I would like to think about is how much these collective acts of joy, of seizing public space, whether with our bodies or boom boxes, or parties, are in fact forms of counter mapping.

Robin D.G. Kelley and Fred Moten, transcript excerpt from a discussion as part of the Master of Visual Studies Proseminar series at the University of Toronto, John H. Daniels Faculty of Architecture, Landscape and Design, 3.4.2017 (quoted from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE>, 1:10:37-1:20:09, slightly re-edited by the authors). Courtesy of the authors

SURVIVING IN THE RUINOUS RUIN

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SBACKWEARTY

SBACKWEARTY

# THE WHISTLE IN THE VOICE

BY NIDA GHOUSE

*Only we control our storm because we are the weather.*

070 Shake

1

The curious case of the dancing plague that struck the medieval city of Strasbourg in the summer of 1518 disrupted the rhythm of daily life through rhythm itself. On 14 July, when Frau Troffea stepped into her solitary dance, most likely unaccompanied even by music, hopping and leaping to a growing crowd, she could not have known that she would not stop for days. Collapsing from exhaustion after hours of frantic motion, she fell asleep briefly only to rise back onto her bruised and bloodied feet again. At the end of the week, she was carried off in a wagon to a chapel in the Vosges mountains, but her compulsion had triggered a crisis: more than thirty others had been seized by the same impulse to dance with wild abandon.<sup>1</sup>

In the minds of many, the delirium of dancing was long endowed with religious significance—a spell from heaven or hell, an ecstatic form of prayer, penance through self-inflicted pain, a way to save one’s soul from purgatory.<sup>2</sup> The general inclination toward such divine retribution was heightened at a time when the clergy was despised for being too decadent and depraved and could not be trusted with granting God’s grace. In 1518 it had not taken long for a connection to be drawn between Frau Troffea’s condition and a vengeful St. Vitus, who according to legend was martyred in Sicily in 303 AD for refusing to give up his faith in Christianity—tempted by seductive dancers at the last stages of his trials and tortures, he resisted them and ascended to paradise.<sup>3</sup> How exactly a relation came to be forged between the trance of such dance and the cult of this saint is a complex story cast over centuries, but it had even gained some legal credence. By the late 1400s, the statute books from Rottweil, a town east of Strasbourg, contained a law which declared that if a person cursed another in the name of the patron saint, the accursed developed a fever and what came to be called St. Vitus’ Dance.<sup>4</sup>

Soon there were fifty that had lapsed into frenzy and a privy council—comprised of members elected from among the Strasbourg elite, namely nobles and burghers with an increasingly uneasy relationship to the bishop—convened to consult the physicians’ guild for a remedy. Convinced that it was a natural condition of hot bloodedness and not an instance of demonic possession, the doctors prescribed more

1 John Waller, *A Time to Dance, A Time to Die*, London: Icon Books, 2009, pp. 1–3. The account of the dancing plague presented here is drawn exclusively from this title and relies on its descriptive formulations and historical contextualisation.

2 Waller, p. 99.

3 Waller, p. 84.

4 Waller, p. 90.

dancing to quell the malady. The council's decision to yield to the wisdom of the medical profession and downplay the holy influence of St. Vitus was indicative of a shifting power dynamic and belief system. Stages were constructed in markets and on mangers, musicians were hired to play through the night, able-bodied men were enlisted to dance with the afflicted to offer them strength, and guards were charged with preventing accidents. Yet sight and suggestion were the very agents of contagion, and everything the officials did only served to encourage those who were prone to join.<sup>5</sup> Amid the drum beats and the melodies, fear gripped the Alsatian city as the poor and the pious continued to take to their feet, dancing without restraint. By the second week of August, up to 400 people had been affected and the council reversed its strategy, banning music and dancing in public.<sup>6</sup> Still, the collective mania did not subside and many would eventually make the long and arduous journey that Frau Troffea had taken—to the shrine of St. Vitus in Saverne, thirty miles away. Only in early September did this oddest of dramas come to an end, but in the meantime, with the fervour of trying to flee an untenable existence, some danced till they fell unconscious, and some danced till they died.<sup>7</sup>

It was a critical juncture in European history: with the Protestant Reformation (1517–1648) just beginning and the popular discontent that mobilised the German Peasants' War (1524–25) steadily mounting, the Holy Roman Empire was on the verge of both religious conflict and class rebellion.<sup>8</sup> Believed to be a curse and a cure, the extraordinary epidemic of 1518 was not an isolated event in that as many as seven spells of uncontrollable dancing had been recorded prior to it: the first as early as 1017, when a group made a real ruckus dancing in a graveyard in the Saxon town of Kölbick; the largest over the course of 1374, beginning in the Rhineland and spreading from Aachen and Ghent in the north to Metz and Strasbourg in the south—“Chroniclers tell of thousands of men and women dancing while screeching with pain, leaping into the air, running madly from place to place and calling on the mercy of God and the saints.”<sup>9</sup>

5 Waller, p. 102.

6 Cf. Waller, pp. 134 & 137. Waller writes, “By this stage, according to the chronicle of the local Imlin'sche family, as many as 400 people had succumbed. Duntzenheim says only 200 were involved.” (p. 137)

7 “Exactly how many fell dead we cannot know, though one chronicle suggests that (at least for a time) fifteen were dying each day as they danced in the punishing summer heat, seldom pausing to eat, drink, or rest.” Waller, p. 4.

8 Waller, p. 11.

9 Waller, p. 9.

The times were brimming with radical uncertainty and the years leading up to Frau Troffea's dance of 1518 had been especially devastating. Drought, famine, and disease, intensified by frozen winters, had cost thousands of lives in Strasbourg. In the face of land and food scarcity, the nobility squeezed peasants further, extracting any surplus, raising taxes, and lowering recompense to insufferable levels. The commons were closing in, and the birth of private property was a substantially transformative condition. High inflation, debilitating debt and the elimination of shared gathering spaces had given rise to unprecedented expressions of collective tumult and individual despair. Moreover, the laity—steeped in supernaturalism—found they had no one to turn to, not even themselves, and had lost all hope of deliverance. They had watched the idle clergy on whom they depended for absolution turn incorrigibly corrupt—indulging in every vice while levying sin taxes on those who had nothing—and the Reformation had pulled the ladder up from heaven with its revolutionary proclamation that mortals could do nothing as such to guarantee entrance, shattering the foundations of their psychical and material worlds.

Despite having entered the archive through a wide range of sources,<sup>10</sup> the dancing plague of Strasbourg has remained on the periphery of historical examination. While a handful of theories have been posited, choreomania, as it came to be called, has escaped any verifiable diagnosis. Like with the authorities of the time—who could neither fathom nor contain the outbreak—a certain illegibility has persisted around the event, whose strangeness and power lies in its resistance to causal analysis. Instead, we might claim, the mass hysteria of 1518 carries within it a performative potential. It was a fatal expression of what could not be said and of what was being repressed in a way of life squeezed from both sides of the emerging Christian and class divides at the dawn of modernity. Its story survives as symptomatic of something irretrievably lost in a moment of structural contradiction beset by epochal transformation.<sup>11</sup>

10 Waller, p. 5. Waller writes, “The Strasbourg dancing epidemic begun by Frau Troffea was the second largest of Europe's dancing plagues. But as it occurred after the invention of the printing press and in a city with at least the beginnings of a formal bureaucracy, it's far better

documented and by a richer variety of sources than any of its predecessors.” (p. 11)

11 I use the term symptomatic in a psychoanalytical sense, and in relation to what Joan Copjec calls “the notion of an existence without predicate.”

This is about the relationship between a whistle and a voice. And about the whistle in the voice. At least that's where it begins, with W.E.B. Du Bois recounting: "And then I made up my mind that knowledge wasn't enough, that even if people were ignorant of essential matters which they had to know... they had not only to know, they had to act."<sup>12</sup> Early one evening, we listen to the whistle on the track that we trace via Fred Moten with whom we're on "an excursion into the stolen life of black things."<sup>13</sup>

A few days on, I replay the same three-minute segment from Du Bois' recorded biography—released in 1961, when he was ninety-three years old—to realise that in that previous instance "the pathological disruption" that Moten had alerted us to, "wherein every sibilant sound [in Du Bois' speech] is subject to a rude extension of a whistle," was somehow the only thing I had heard.<sup>14</sup> I had blanked on words, cancelled out what was cognisable. "I found that this Negro, Sam Hose, had been caught and lynched and that in the meat market, which was on the way I had to pass, his fingers and toes were being exhibited." Neither the immediate shock nor the larger significance of what Du Bois was speaking about had registered earlier. "Well, I didn't deliver the letter," he goes on.

It was 1899, three decades since the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had granted formal citizenship rights and equal protection of the law to former slaves. Du Bois describes his own life at the time—in his 1940 autobiographical essay *Dusk of Dawn*—as "when my studies were most successful," and the incident as one that "cut across this plan which I had as a scientist, a red ray which could not be ignored."<sup>15</sup> He had been carrying a letter of introduction to the offices of *The Atlanta Constitution*, along with "a careful and reasoned statement concerning the evident facts" surrounding the accusations that had spawned a huge white mob hunting for a black man across the southern state of Georgia. Sam Hose had fled the plantation on which he worked after defending himself—with the axe he had in his hands—against his employer Alfred Cranford—who was threatening to kill him with a gun. Cranford had died and rumours, fuelled by the press, that Hose had sexually

assaulted his wife and harmed his child spread like wildfire. The authorities caught and arrested Hose, but soon after he found himself outside the law and in the custody of the lynch mob. On 23 April, Hose was tortured, mutilated, doused with kerosene, and burnt alive at the stake; people made souvenirs of his remains. Du Bois was walking on his way to the newspaper when news of the lynching reached him. He stopped in his tracks, turned around and went back to Atlanta University where he was teaching. He would in fact end up turning away from his job as well: "Two considerations thereafter broke in upon my work and eventually disrupted it: first, one could not be a calm, cool, and detached scientist while Negroes were lynched, murdered, and starved; and secondly, there was no such definite demand for scientific work of the sort that I was doing," he writes in retrospect. He would resign from his position and move to New York in 1910 to join the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

On the audio file, Du Bois was rationalising how these circumstances had compelled him to transition from studying the Negro problem towards a civil rights activism that demanded an affective engagement with black suffering and a political will to remedy the economic and legal realities that conditioned black criminality. This was at once a critique of the limitations of his own belief in the necessity to base social reform on the objectivity of social facts<sup>16</sup> and a recognition of a professional incommensurability: what he was fighting for ultimately required a reconstitution of the powers inherent in the institutional structures of knowledge production that were supporting his scholarship. This was a pivotal moment in Du Bois' career, and, as I would come to understand, for the history of the black radical tradition. But I also remained struck by how I remembered having just heard the whistle in his voice initially. How could I have entirely missed what Du Bois was pronouncing? Had I been tuned to a single frequency? Was (our reading of) Moten responsible for this? Can one acquire antenna only for "sound against or above speech," for that which moves "over the edge of meaning"?<sup>17</sup> And what is to be made of such listening?

<sup>12</sup> W.E.B. Du Bois and Moses Asch, *W.E.B. Du Bois: A Recorded Autobiography*, New York: Folkways Records FH-5511 LP, 1961.

<sup>13</sup> Fred Moten, "Uplift and Criminality," *Stolen Life*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2018, p. 115.

<sup>14</sup> Moten, p. 133.

<sup>15</sup> W.E.B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward and Autobiography of a Race Concept*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1940/2017, p. 34.

<sup>16</sup> Moten, p. 132.

<sup>17</sup> Moten, p. 130.

“[P]erhaps I make too much of an involuntary impediment,” Moten just about disclaims in what seems to be some kind of requisite courtesy to that very enterprise of reading that con(s)t(r)ains the possibility of improvisational discovery.<sup>18</sup> There is after all a serious charge against Du Bois, brought to the fore by the work of Kevin Gaines, that Moten is attending to. Referring to the same period when Du Bois made up his mind that knowledge wasn’t enough and began distancing himself from the discourse of urban criminology which he had helped establish—a crucial period, Moten notes, between 1896 and 1903, when he was also researching and writing *The Philadelphia Negro* and *The Souls of Black Folk*—Gaines argues that Du Bois nevertheless maintained an uncritical commitment to bourgeois norms of social organisation seen, for instance, in his easy conflation of crime and “a cheap and dangerous socialism,” or in how he promoted black assimilation in the interest of racial upliftment, relying on a cultural politics that was fraught with the white supremacism it was meant to overturn.<sup>19</sup> Moten finds Gaines’ insights astute, wants to follow him and veer off from his enabling path.

Working by way of “the paralinguistic and its chances,” lingering in “the lyricism of the surplus,” is necessary for Moten to hear what he hears in Du Bois, which is an extraintentional fugitivity.<sup>20</sup> Even or especially when Du Bois is most susceptible to the normative ideals of a black elitism, there seems to be another order of rebellion and transgression at play, another order of criminality. What Moten hears in Du Bois’ whistle is Du Bois’ “own improper, unowned disruption,” something at once internal to him and out of his control.<sup>21</sup> “Speech breaking from propriety, on the run from ownership.”<sup>22</sup> It is a fugitivity that operates on the edges of detectability, and yet holds within it “some important information regarding the history of blackness as politicoaesthetic assertion.”<sup>23</sup>

3

“A girl walks home in the first minutes of a race riot, before it might even be called that.”<sup>24</sup> Bhanu Kapil dedicates her novel—which is not a novel, which is at once both less and more than a novel—to Blair

18 Moten, p. 133.

19 Moten, pp. 132, 120, 123–124 & 128.

20 Moten, pp. 115–116.

21 Moten, p. 133.

22 Moten, p. 130.

23 Moten, p. 121.

24 Bhanu Kapil, *Ban en Banlieue*, New York: Nightboat Books, 2015, p. 32.

Peach, the emigrant teacher from New Zealand who was knocked unconscious by a member of the Metropolitan Police Special Patrol Group during an Anti-Nazi League demonstration in Southall, an immigrant suburb of West London “in which it would be rare—nauseating—to see a white face.”<sup>25</sup> Yet on 23 April 1979 the National Front had decided to have its annual meeting in the townhall there, and 2875 police officers were deployed to protect the British far-right’s right of assembly. Peach, whose skull was fractured, was thirty-three years old when he died in Ealing Hospital the next day. Medical testimony suggested that the blow had been struck by something other than a baton and a raid on the lockers of the SPG officers concerned revealed a number of unauthorised weapons. An internal inquiry into Peach’s killing found one principal suspect from a group of six officers, and that three of them had conspired in a cover-up, attempting to frustrate the fact-finding mission and perverting the course of justice. The counsel representing the police had access to the report but went to great lengths to conceal its discovery from everyone else involved in the inquest jury that had been set up, a jury which would then—despite eleven eyewitness accounts and other circumstantial evidence—reach a verdict in May the following year: death by misadventure. As far as the law of those above the law was concerned, Peach had risked his own life voluntarily. “He is the martyr of my novel although he does not appear in it. He appears here. He appears now. He appears before the novel begins,” Kapil declares on a page beside a photograph of him.<sup>26</sup>

It’s midday on a Monday on the platform in Ostkreuz. We put three names down on a collective ticket for five. We settle into our seats when the train arrives and before we get to the crackers and cheese, we switch copies of Kapil’s *Ban en Banlieue*. What kind of exchange is this? A copy of something in return for a copy of the same thing. I slip the book in my bag, and at some point in the coming days I will turn to Kapil’s dedication again and find myself doing the math. It took thirty-one years—he had been dead almost as long as he had been alive—before the Metropolitan Police released the reports acknowledging Peach’s killing. I would then draw the line I had not anticipated drawing back to this moment, and know exactly what kind of journey we are making.

25 Kapil, p. 37.

26 Kapil, p. 14.

It's 7 January 2019 and it's been fourteen years since an asylum seeker's body was burnt to char in police custody in Germany. In cell number five in the basement of the station in the city of Dessau, on a mattress on a platform just off the floor, Oury Jalloh from Sierra Leone lay on his back like a starfish, wrists and ankles chained, and yet they claim it was he who had set himself aflame. A few hours later, when the videographer from the State Office of Criminal Investigation in Saxony-Anhalt conducted an onsite examination, he described himself going down to where "a black African [had] burnt himself," thereby inscribing the police's legal defence onto the primary crime scene image he was making. The risk of fire in the tiled cell was extremely low; a single glance at the state of the corpse and the soot on the walls indicated its scale was immense; yet no forensic analysis was deemed necessary. Three days after material from the holding cell had been collected, itemised, and named, the remains of a partially-melted red plastic lighter were said to have surfaced in the debris taken from underneath Jalloh's body. According to the police's own assertion, no such article had been on his person during the strip search that was conducted when Jalloh was arrested.

The lighter was admitted into evidence and the construction of an impossible labyrinth of facts and counter facts was set into motion. One technicality requires the next: no fingerprints, no DNA, no fibres from Jalloh's clothing or from the mattress were found on the plastic. Further speculations had to have already conceded to this premise: for the lighter to have been in the fire, to have survived in the state it was in, it would have had to have been protected, by Jalloh's body for instance. Other theories shift the discussion of whether Jalloh had been murdered to conspiracies that cannot be proven: is that why the video documentation stopped abruptly after four minutes and fifteen seconds? Jalloh's corpse would have been removed from the frame, and had the lighter been underneath him, it would have had to appear in the image. A mythical space is produced where the phantom of police power prevails, where the law can fabulate and need not question that which is inconceivable to common sense.

In December 2008, in a controversial trial lasting fifty-nine days instead of the scheduled six, the District Court of Dessau-Roßlau acquitted the two police officers for lack of evidence. The presiding judge accepted the claim that Oury Jalloh had committed suicide. That is to say, he took it for granted that Jalloh had managed to retrieve a lighter that he could not have had from his pocket, rip open the

seams of the fireproof mattress, and start a blaze that would need at least two litres of accelerant for an independent commission to later recreate, all while being flat on his back with his wrists and ankles shackled in four different directions to rings embedded in the very structure of the holding cell. The judge was merely concerned as to whether there was a case for negligence—the police had turned off the fire alarm, ignored calls for help coming from the cell via the intercom, were sloppy with reconstructing the chronology of events for the court, contradicting each other, saying they could not remember what happened that morning—and whether these actions damaged the state. Oury Jalloh was a black man drunk on the streets of Dessau, allegedly harassing two sanitation workers at dawn when he asked them for a cell phone to make a call. He resisted identification—probably because his status was a non-status called *Duldung*<sup>27</sup>—and had thus been taken to the station. The judge of the first trial did not establish whether Jalloh's arrest, subsequent blood test, and solitary confinement had been lawful in the first place. What is actually at stake is a structural racism that slips somewhere else before we can name it, and yet is inherent in every single stage of authority involved in the process.

Two hours later, at the station in Dessau, a notice on the door to the toilets states they are all out of order. The message is clear: we—now much larger than three, and arriving from different parts of Germany—are not welcome here. Outside, the boys who had been sitting across the aisle from us doing homework are standing by the steps with KPD flags; members of The VOICE Refugee Forum are organising among the crowd. People are huddled, people are dancing, on a truck-turned-stage facing sideways, a rapper is performing—every now and then hands go up in the air.

In 2010, the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe reversed the judgement and assigned the case to the District Court of Magdeburg. The new trial which ended in December 2012 fined one of the officers 10,800 euros for involuntary manslaughter. After an independent commission of international experts invited by the Initiative in Memory of Oury Jalloh ruled out the possibility of self-immolation, the public prosecutor's office in Dessau-Roßlau launched another investigation

<sup>27</sup> Rejected asylum seekers, who cannot be deported immediately due to so-called deportation obstacles, receive a "certificate of temporary suspension of deportation." In German, it's officially described as a *Duldung*, literally a form of toleration.

in April 2014 and came to consider the use of combustive agents and third party involvement. But the proceedings were withdrawn from its jurisdiction and reassigned to the public prosecutor's office in Halle, who eventually discontinued the proceedings by October 2017 maintaining that additional clarification cannot be expected. In the meantime, a new autopsy found a broken nose and a burst eardrum, and two unexplained deaths said to have occurred in the same police station on Wolfgangstraße 25 in Dessau came to light—their case files had been destroyed. Attempts by the Die Linke party to establish a committee of inquiry would be met with disinterest from all other members of parliament. Time to forget, they must think, but do they not know that this annual demonstration is not going away, and will only get bigger with all the persistence of protracted labour that remembrance is. "OURY JALLOH—DAS WAR MORD!" is the refrain.

We recognise Mouctar Bah from the Kritnet Conference a few months ago, who initiates the gathering into the reasons for being here, the proceedings to follow, the stops on the way. The march will begin, carrying signs on black boxes, leaving traces in places, making speeches, tying shoe laces. We came on our own, to find ourselves together with others we don't know, and—even as the cold creeps into our bones—it is this being-in-common that will reverberate by the end of the evening. At one point, a symbolic action takes place: standing along the barricades in front of the offices of the state's attorney, lighters are thrown at the entrance to the building and at the feet of those men in riot gear.

4

The body is a resonant device. Inside the press conference, outside of language, this is my note-to-self. "Generell macht niemand irgendetwas allein," Helene Duldung, the artist's spokesperson, would exclaim in response to the only question from the audience. In that moment the words would be but sound to me, and yet, I would have already known, and no matter what she had said, it would have always been (also) exactly this that she had meant: "Generally, no one does anything alone." The floor had been opened, there was no script anymore. In anticipation of an authorial voice that would remain silent, Duldung answered and did the very thing that she was saying. She marked out a "we"—not a fixed unity, but a space in between—in the very moment of its becoming.

TUMULT

There was also some such entity that came into being during the dancing plague of Strasbourg from 1518. The question of volition is crucial to this—in relation to (loss of) control, and as a claim to (un)sovereignty as well. For instance, we are told the dancing was rhythmic; it may not have been a choreographed set, but neither was it a series of unconscious epileptic fits nor halogenic trips. We also know that these bodies were bodies in pain: this wasn't a kind of joyous ecstasy they were partaking in. Many dancers may have chosen to join out of faith, or for other reasons, but there was nevertheless something unusual about this, for there was no pre-determined agreement among them as to what they were doing or for how long they would be doing it. It was impossible for any kind of authority to pre-emptively detect and prevent this occurrence, for nothing had been planned and there was no consensus. Even while it was happening, no one quite knew what to do about it. What kind of cooperative action—of coming into composition with one another—was this? How did suggestion and mimeses, or even possession, function? On the bodily level, we know that the dancing exceeded the dancers' normative capacities, which is to say that we do not know how those who survived could have physically sustained themselves. The dancing took place on some kind of border of their own in/voluntariness. As if the dancers transgressed a limit within themselves and went beyond their selves. They lost control—their lives, in any case, were lives over which they might have felt they had no say—and in doing so together in time they produced a space under duress that was out of the control of anyone else.

I'm looking for the structural inscription of a collective resistance that could never have been organised in advance. Like a surplus or an excess that cannot be made productive. On one level, I think this has something to do with the outer edges of ownership, in the manner of that which belongs to you, but cannot be owned even by yourself. It thus cannot be taken away by anyone or anything else. On another level, it's about how what one has only comes into being—and furthermore, amplifies—when in relation. It is a common form of an inarticulate expression that registers retroactively; it is written in(to) language, but is without content; we know it is meaningful, and yet we cannot say exactly what we meant by it. In that sense it has something to do with noise as well.

NIDA GHOUSE

\* \* \*

Can words be made to whistle? The question dances on the page before it starts to write. Words—like stones—are at once whole and broken, and if the reality they refer to is such strange stuff, then whistle they must.

B A P R C K G W E A S R D


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B A O K W A R D

P B A C K W A R D S

P R B A C K W A R D S S







TUMULT

MAURICE LOUCA - VISUAL MEMO



2017/11/16  
30/11/16  
48  
24 BLOCKS  
□ - : 22 1/2 SECONDS

# PAN - TIME FRAMES - SKETCH

## 24 HOUR MATRIX - A SYMBOLIC CLOCK

ECHO WAITS (MOUNTAIN TOP)

12 PAN

A FALL OF SOUND: [IV -> I.]

THE VELOCITY OF SOUND IS GREATER THAN THE VELOCITY OF CANNON BALLS.

- MIDNIGHT PAN - 24



ca. 21''

ca. 13''

Dead Stroke

*mp/f*

215.507.369 49.494.856

*p/mp*

Dead Stroke *mf*

*fff* *mp/f* *fff*

*ff*

1.296.421 377.971.716

*p/mp*

Dead Stroke

*ff* *mp/f*

98.302.922 1.820.248.031

*p/mp*

ca. 15''

ca. 21''

*ff* *mp/f* *ff*

88.787.131

*p/mf*

*mp/f* *f* *mp/f* *p*

*ff*




1.257.194.328

*p/mf*

*ff* *mp/f* *ff*

377.971.716

*p/mf*



C BACKWARD T

C CURRENT T

C BACKWARD T

B BACKWARD

C CURRENT T  
B BACKWARD

B CURRENT

**PROPER AND  
IMPROPER (RUINS)  
LEGALLY SPEAKING**





NATASHA  
NATASHA  
NATASHA  
NATASHA  
NATASHA  
NATASHA  
NATASHA  
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SCHÖN



Guten Morgen sehr verehrte Damen und Herren, geehrte Vertreter\*innen der Presse, liebe Freund\*innen,

ich möchte Ihnen die künstlerische Position für die Präsentation im Deutschen Pavillon bekannt geben und anhand von vorausgegangenen Projekten vorstellen. Anschließend werde ich einen Ausblick auf den Prozess bis zur Präsentation im Mai 2019 in Venedig geben.

Die Präsentation im Deutschen Pavillon der Biennale di Venezia 2019 wird von Natascha Süder Happelmann entwickelt.

Die Künstler\*in nähert sich dieser bedeutenden Aufgabe, indem sie als erste Handlung ihren Namen anpasst. Die Anpassung geschieht unter Berücksichtigung verschiedener Parameter. Erlauben Sie mir, dies näher zu erläutern:

Über einen Zeitraum von rund dreißig Jahren ist im Gedächtnis der Künstler\*in und an anderen Orten eine Sammlung von Namensvarianten entstanden. Diese kam vornehmlich durch Fehlschreibung und Autokorrektur bei der Adressierung der Künstler\*in durch öffentliche Stellen zustande. Dadurch entstand im Laufe der Zeit eine Instabilität im Namensbild, die für diese – national wie international – repräsentative Aufgabe nicht adäquat scheint. Die Künstler\*in möchte sich also durch die Maßnahme der Anpassung dieser bedeutenden repräsentativen Herausforderung – der Gestaltung des Deutschen Pavillons in Venedig – stellen. Die optimale Form dafür ist Integration. Nach sorgfältiger Prüfung der verfügbaren Versionen wurde eine Namensvariante ausgewählt. Die Auswahl erfolgte unter Zuhilfenahme algorithmischer sowie gesellschaftlicher Parameter. Es handelt sich um eine umfassende und daher, denke ich, doch recht repräsentative Erhebung, die einen signifikanten Zeitraum umspannt.

In der Folge wurde der angepasste Name durch phonologische Untersuchungen verifiziert und auf seine Eignung getestet. Dabei wurde vor allem der Zusammenhang zwischen Wortbetonung und Silbengewicht überprüft. Die Klangbilder oder Klangmuster verschiedener Silbenkombinationen Sö-der, Sü-der, Sa-der, Ha, Hu, Hi, Hippel, Hagel, Happel haben

jeweils einen ganz eigenen metrischen und lautmalerischen Charakter und rufen verschiedene emotionale Reaktionen hervor.

Natascha Süder Happelmann wurde also durch die voranbeschriebenen Verfahren als der geeignete und angemessene Name, ergo der Eigenname für diese bedeutende Aufgabe ermittelt. Eigennamen wurden im Prozess ihrer Institutionalisierung zunächst vornehmlich aus steuertechnischen Gründen und für die Erfassung militärisch nutzbarer Arbeitskräfte eingeführt. Da der Name sowohl zur Identifikation von Individuen als auch zur Erhebung von Daten über die Bevölkerung diente, musste er lesbar und eindeutig sein. Aus der legalen Fiktion wurde später eine politische Technologie, die nicht nur die systematische Betrachtung und Verwaltung der Bevölkerung ermöglichte – demografische Erhebung, Strafregister, Steuerregister, Wahlregister, Impfung und Gesundheitsregister –, sondern auch Identität formte und diese als eine stabile und permanente bestimmte. Wenn mir an dieser Stelle eine persönliche Bemerkung erlaubt sei: »Wenn ich Farben kaufe [ich aquarellierte in meiner Freizeit (Einschub der Sprecherin)], dann nur im Hinblick auf ihre Namen. Der Name der Farbe (Indisch-Gelb, Persisch-Rot, Ceylonit-Grün) [...] ist dann das Versprechen einer Lust, das Programm eines Vorgehens. Es gibt immer Zukünftiges in [...] Namen. [...] Das WORT reizt mich entsprechend dieser Vorstellung, daß ich etwas mit ihm machen werde: Es ist das Erzittern eines künftigen Tuns, so etwas wie Appetit. Dieses Verlangen erschüttert das unbewegliche Bild der sprachlichen Ausdrucksweise.« \*\*

Aber zurück zur Sache: Die Elaborationen über das angewendete Verfahren möchten deutlich machen, dass es sich bei der Anpassung des Namens nicht um eine willkürliche Geste handelt. Die Anpassung ist für Natascha Süder Happelmann eine künstlerisch zwingende, eine notwendige Entscheidung. Und ich bitte die Vertreter\*innen der Presse, dies zu respektieren und in angemessener Form zu behandeln.

Natascha Süder Happelmann initiierte 2004 die Biografie-Tauschbörse bioswop.net, über die künstlerisch tätige Personen ihre CVs tauschen können. Die Tauschinitiative diente dazu, das Künstler-CV von seiner repräsentativen Rolle zu entbinden. Das Curriculum Vitae, hoch gehandelt in der Kunst, übersetzt künstlerische Aktivität in Listen, Ökonomien von Herkunft, Alter, Leistung und Mobilität. Doch in den letzten Jahren wurde diese Form der Repräsentation von Erfolg durch die algorithmische Erfassung und Auswertung verschiedenster personenbezogener

Daten im Internet entwertet. Man könnte sagen, das Internet machte das Künstler-CV obsolet. Konzepte wie Identität, Repräsentation, Fakt, Selbst sind in dieser Datenerfassung nur Teil einer rechnerischen Anhäufung und potenziell austauschbar mit anderen Konzepten. Dadurch werden diese scheinbar stabilen Faktoren und Kriterien zu wabernden Flows, die sich gleichzeitig in unterschiedliche Richtungen bewegen und formen. Die Hierarchisierung und Bearbeitung der Daten wird von Algorithmen vorgenommen, nicht von den Künstler\*innen oder ihren Galerien. Die Fetischmacht der Erscheinung sucht sich andere Bildketten. Und die vormals als bedeutend eingeschätzte Formation ›Individuum‹ zerfließt in Datenströme und kondividuelle Räume und sucht sich neue Formen der Subjektivierung.

Ich bedanke mich sehr für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit. Ich hoffe, Sie in Venedig wiederzusehen. Vielleicht sogar schon vorher. Herzlichen Dank.

\*\* Zitiert nach Roland Barthes, Über mich selbst (Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, 1975), übersetzt von Jürgen Hoch, München: Matthes & Seitz, 1978

Excerpt from the presentation of the artistic position by the artist's spokesperson, Helene Duldung, 25.10.2018, Zeughauskino, Berlin





**DEUTSCHER 20**  
**PAVILLON 19**

**LA BIENNALE**  
**DI VENEZIA**

**NAT|**



**NAT**

**NATIONAL**

**NATO**

**NATIONWIDE**

**NATALIE PORTMAN**

**NATION OF ISLAM**

**NATURE IMAGES**

**NATALIE DORMER**

**DEUTSCHER 20**  
**PAVILLON 19**

**LA BIENNALE**  
**DI VENEZIA**

**NATASCHA SÜ|**



**NATASCHA SÜDER HAPPELMANN**

**NATASCHA SADRE PAPPPELMANN**

**NATASCHA SÖDER HAGIMAN**

**NATASCHA SADER HANGMAN**

**NATASCHA SÖDRE HANGGGGGE**

**NATASCHA SADR GGELMA**

**NATASCHA SÜDRE HANGHIGHAN**

→ ATASOHA RFDUS HAH >EVPAH  
→ ATASOHA RFDUS HAH >EVPAH  
→ ATASOHA RFDUS HAH >EVPAH  
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


Franciska Zolyom

Helene Duldung

Natascha Süder Happelmann

Beatrice Di Buduo



**ANTROPOMORPHISE MY CAPITAL!**

**PROJEKTIONSDETAIL**

**DESINTEGRIERT EUCH!,**

**3. HERBSTSALON, MAXIM GORKI THEATER, BERLIN 2017**

DEUTSCHES  
PAVILLON



DEUTSCHES HISTORISCHES MUSEUM




DEUTSCHES  
HISTORISCHES  
MUSEUM





So how did we get here? To be brutally short, I can indicate a few means. The fetish of the individual, artists or citizen, and the sanctity of their property rights to their own speech and creative imagination is both a result of and a compensation for the total ban on thinking in terms of community, collectivity or trans-individual responsibilities and harms that decades of neoliberal ideology, as materialised in the conditions of everyday life, have established as the absolute bedrock of whatever social contract we can still talk about. The fetish of the sovereign individual means that fascists can organise wounded individuals who feel their individual rights are being infringed



B ABCORRDNERRSRD

B BACORRDNERRSRD

B AOCRRDNERRSR

B BOARRKNVERRRDS

B OBARCKNVERRDRS

# ENTRE CHIEN ET LOUP

BY FRANCISKA ZÓLYOM

1

The return of the wolves is not without its history. As a hunter, like the human being, the *Canis lupus* inhabits the entire northern hemisphere until the Neolithic Age and, before *Homo sapiens* conquers all the continents, it is the most widespread mammal on Earth. The human's relationship with the wolf oscillates between fascination and competition, expressed in various myths, figures and stories: the Inuits see it as their brother, the Native Americans honour the wolf as their founding father, and in both Egyptian mythology and the culture of the Aborigines, the "wolf" constellation is associated with ancestry. The wolf has attributions linked with the past, and this, together with its adaptability and mobility, gives it the ability to pass between worlds with light-footed ease.

When *Homo sapiens* settles down and begins to raise livestock, divide up land and define it as property, there is a fundamental change in the relationship between man and wolf. The imagined kinship fades into the background. And while the species *Canis lupus familiaris*, or the dog, which is subordinate to the wolf, has long since become a human companion, the perception of wolves is sometimes subject to demonisation. The myth of the werewolf—the metamorphosis of a human being into a bloodthirsty wolf(man)—is infused with fear and fascination. From the 13th to the 17th century, this belief is so strong in Europe that alleged werewolves are burned at the stake in the course of witch-hunts.

From now on, wolves are stigmatised again and again, and—under the mantle of a need to protect human possessions—hunted. Systematic persecution since the 15th century more or less wiped them out in Central and Northern Europe.<sup>1</sup> Even though wolf populations living in the wilderness today provide a surface onto which our longing for "intact" nature and peaceful coexistence can be projected, the wolf is simultaneously seen as an intruder who forcibly takes what does not belong to him. The topic is politically exploited with catchwords like *Herdenschutz* (herd protection) and *Schieß-erlaubnis* (permission to shoot).

The history of the expulsion of wolves runs parallel to the emergence of sovereign states and the idea of citizenship. It can be

<sup>1</sup> So-called wolf stones are a reminder of when the last wolf was killed in a given region. The first wolves living "in the wild" again in Germany were found in a military training area in Oberlausitz, Saxony. Throughout Germany, in spite of the war exercises that take place there, and for the very reason that they are enclosed, such areas are biotopes, home to a wide diversity of species.

recounted on the basis of a series of divisions and distinctions, for example between wilderness and domestication, man and nature, being settled and freedom of movement, or possession and possessionlessness. The constricted view of the hunter is also inscribed in this story. Focused on his rights and driven by the conviction of his superiority over nature, he closes his finger on the trigger without recognising himself in the crosshairs.

2

The links between the figure of the wolf and that of the *Friedlos*, the bandit who belongs to no community, are revealed by Giorgio Agamben in *Homo sacer*: he equates the “bandit’s liminal status”<sup>2</sup> with the wolf-man or werewolf, half animal, half human. Like *homo sacer*, who according to Roman law cannot be sacrificed, but may be killed without fear of punishment, he stands on the threshold between nature and culture; he exists in both worlds at the same time, but belongs to neither. According to Agamben, this borderline position between *phýsis* (i.e. nature or the real world) and *nómos* (i.e. human and divine law), and the power inherent in these two worlds, not only characterises the conditions *before* the introduction of law, preceding civil rights and the social contract. Rather, the violence that freely disposes of the “bare life” of the exile, *homo sacer*, with no form of criminal liability, is a continual prerequisite for the “authentically political,”<sup>3</sup> and remains a constitutive element of the sovereign state. This essential link between violence and the state manifests itself most clearly in a state of emergency. In a moment of danger, such as an interstate conflict or civil war, to which Thomas Hobbes’ anthropological formula “*homo homini lupus est*” (man is a wolf to men) historically refers, sovereign power unmasks itself as fundamentally violent. The most extreme escalation of this power, which is based on violence, takes place in the extraterritorial space of the camp.

The paradox of simultaneous exclusion and inclusion, inherent in both communities and states, was recognised by Roland Barthes in the fact that the excluded individual is enclosed within them with-

out losing his status of exclusion. Even more so, he is integrated as a disintegrated individual.<sup>4</sup> This implies that the “moment” of the state of emergency can be extended, becoming perpetuated within the system. Integrated exclusion provides the legitimation for the use of violence, which can be activated again and again.

The question now is, how could the non-differentiation between animal and human, nature and culture and the ambiguity that Agamben recognises in the Italian term of the ban (*in bando, a bandono*), which means at the same time the excluded and the free, be utilised for a politics freed from the form of the State<sup>5</sup> or a post-modern understanding of community? What forms of self-determination and refusal already exist, and what additional forms are conceivable? What autonomous political role can be assumed by the disintegrated individual?

In his last book *Prisoner of Love*, in which he looks back on his visits to Palestinian refugee camps (and his relationship with a young Fedayeen), Jean Genet describes a momentum of non-identity and metamorphosis in which the perceptible merges with the imaginary: “Entre chien et loup. The hour in which—and it’s a space rather than a time—every being becomes his own shadow, and thus something other than himself. The hour of metamorphoses, when people half hope, half fear that a dog will become a wolf. The hour that comes down to us from at least as far back as the Middle Ages, when country people believed that transformation might happen at any moment.”<sup>6</sup> In French, the term “entre chien et loup” stands for twilight, the time when something is no longer itself, but has yet to become something different. Genet writes from a space loaded with aesthetic and existential tension, where violence, metamorphosis and joy coexist, where anything is possible because there is nothing to lose. It is a space that is not clearly defined and not clearly delimitable. Names, images and ideas are transformed into an experience that is lived, the experience of being able to be something else, and not an indivisible whole.

2 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 63.

3 Agamben, p. 64.

4 Cf. Roland Barthes, Lecture at the Collège de France, Session March 16, 1977, in: *How to Live Together. Novelistic Simulations of Some Everyday Spaces*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 81.

5 Agamben, p. 65.

6 Jean Genet, *Prisoner of Love* (1986), Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1992, p. 220.

3

This kind of ambiguity runs counter to the logic of governmentality,<sup>7</sup> if this logic consists of “ordering” and “administering” reality, or in other words, dividing it up into different, separate and super- and subordinate areas, making it “manageable” by means of laws, norms, institutions and discourses. The multiple connections between historical and contemporary forms of domination, discrimination and subjugation are not only reflected in discourse, but rather they are (re)produced by means of language. By giving a name to living beings, things and phenomena that unambiguously defines them, forms of existence, places and identities are at the same time isolated from one another. Violent conflicts sometimes arise at the borders drawn by these demarcations. “Power has always arrogated the right to mark its others while going about unmarked itself,” writes Trinh T. Minh-ha. “Within an economy of movement, the dominant self, the ‘universal subject’, represents himself as flexible, explorative, ‘uncolored’ and unbonded in his moves, while those caught in the margin of non-movement are represented as ‘colored’, authentic—that is, uncomplicatedly locatable and custom-bound. Always eager to demarcate the others’ limits, We only set up frontiers for ourselves when Our interest is at stake.”<sup>8</sup>

If these demarcations run along the lines of the interests of power for which they stand, there must also be movements that step over these boundaries, perforate them, in order to ensure that the space between here and there, this side and the other, is shareable. Representative speech about or for others naturalises—beyond equality—rights and prohibitions, assigns status and creates realities of life, simultaneously reinforcing and fixating them. In so doing, it distances itself not only from that or those which it describes, but also abandons the social, cultural, ecological and political effects it creates.

In his essay *Grammaire africaine*,<sup>9</sup> Barthes investigates the rhetoric of the French colonial rulers in Algeria and Morocco, speaking of an “axiomatic use of language” that attributes certain characteristics to the native population, devalues local social structures and naturalises colonial power structures. The meanings of words are literally turned into their opposite in order to legitimise foreign

7 Michel Foucault, “Gouvernementalité,” lecture at the Collège de France, 1978, in: *Dits et écrits*, edited by François Ewald and Daniel Defert, Paris: Gallimard, 1994.

8 Trinh T. Minh-ha, *elsewhere, within here. immigration, refugeeism and the boundary event*, New York/London: Routledge, 2011, p. 51.

9 Roland Barthes, “Grammaire africaine,” in: *Mythologies*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957.

rule. This combination of attribution, heteronomy and masking is also found in political rhetoric today. When, for example, armed conflict is described as the pacification of unrest, when the victims of violence are pronounced suspects, when “initial reception centres,” which make community building almost impossible, are referred to as community accommodation, or when migrants and the helpers who show solidarity with them are criminalised. In the name of *Willkommenskultur* (welcoming culture), migrants are referred to as “guests,” and are then told where, when and how to be guests. They are asked for their names only in order to be registered, identified and categorised. This rhetoric invents deceptive expressions such as *Duldung* (tolerance) or *Ankerzentrum*, the effects of which are felt by migrants before they understand them, before they learn that they are neither guests nor welcome.

4

“So how did we get here?,” asks Marina Vishmidt, and summarises laconically: “To be brutally short, I can indicate a few means. The fetish of the individual, artist or citizen, and the sanctity of their property rights to their own speech and creative imagination is both a result of and a compensation for the total ban on thinking in terms of community, collectivity or trans-individual responsibilities...”<sup>10</sup> It is the combination of individuality, collectivity and the question of who or what has the right to define itself or to imagine (itself in community with others) that makes this statement so explosive. In this context, the interesting lines of thought are those that arrive at trans-individual, or rather conindividual concepts through a critical examination of the concept of community. They challenge the idea of community with regard to its own identitary demarcation (similarity *as distinct from*), to its unity in the sense of a reductive (because standardising) characteristic, to the totalitarian danger of unconditional cohesion, or to its political instrumentalisation in the name of what is claimed to be “common sense.” Instead, they prefer to delineate the divisibility, relationality and resistance of community and the forms of existence that are conceivable within it. These are forms

10 Marina Vishmidt, unpublished manuscript, 2018, with the kind permission of the writer.

of existence that connect with each other in different ways, but in their respective diversity they are identical neither in themselves nor in their relationships.

In order to avoid the cohesion, unity and governability, the controllability of the individual<sup>11</sup> and the community, the representatives of these lines of thought deploy concepts such as “being together” (Maurice Blanchot), “being in common” and “being-with” (Jean-Luc Nancy), “condividuality” (Gerald Raunig), “becoming with” (Donna Haraway), “difference within” (Trinh T. Minh-ha) or “undercommons” (Stephano Harney, Fred Moten). These concepts reflect the kaleidoscopic diversity they provide for thinking, speaking and acting. They stand for approaches that understand sociality as a network of interactions, responsibilities and processes in which subjectivity and collectivity always generate more, then yet another more, time after time. As a plethora of micropolitics, concerns and needs that come together and break away from one another, in the sense of “undercommons” they elude the regulating power of political community as well as the biopolitical call for self-optimisation.

Something that cannot be clearly defined or located, that refuses to stay in one place or the place assigned to it, is something that generates resistance. And if the identity of forms of existence is based on the quality of the relationships they are able to establish and abandon, it generates diversity, mobility and polyphony. In this way, it is able to help structurally suppressed, repressed, discriminated, delegitimised entities, or concerns which have no voice of their own (such as a struggle for the intactness of a forest, a river, biotopes) to attain an audible presence.

Marco Deseriis speaks of “improper names,” names that are deliberately inappropriate and wrong and which, as a result, do not allow themselves to be measured and appropriated.<sup>12</sup> By undermining the authenticity of the individual, they subvert the value (of possession) of individual subjectivity, granting anonymity to their multiple users. “Improper names” stands for the shared understanding of a non-

<sup>11</sup> The self-contained unit of meaning of “individual” (that which is indivisible in its unique form) is already a questionable concept in the age of algorithmic data processing, where the measurement of the ego takes place through the storage and evaluation of its relationships. The transmission of data on such things as an individual’s whereabouts, consumer behaviour, health and social environment, in other words, his or her “dividual transactions,” continuously increases

“informational capital,” (Marco Deseriis, “The Politics of Condividuality,” 2018, <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0318/deseriis/en>), which can be used for an optimised form of controlling “individual” behaviour, desire and imagination.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Marco Deseriis, *Improper Names. Collective Pseudonyms from the Luddites to Anonymous*, Minneapolis/ London: University of Minnesota Press, 2015.

identity that can be claimed by different individuals or groups for different purposes. They disguise identity by disseminating and constantly changing; in this way they never have full knowledge of what or whom they denote, and yet they facilitate mutual recognition, connection, solidarity. In this sense, they produce condividual identities—beyond the individual and the collective.

5

Extreme—because they are existentially extremely precarious—forms of “being in common,” of “being-with” arise in processes of migration, which today affect more than 250 million people worldwide. The movement of migrants, says Avery F. Gordon, mirrors “border control rendered by its objective effects on the person who never moves alone.”<sup>13</sup> The person who never moves alone has lived in the “provisional” extraterritory of refugee camps for decades, sat hunched together with hundreds of others in an overcrowded dinghy on the open sea, inhabited an “initial reception centre” in a confined space with others, existed without civil rights (as an estimated number), worked in fields and factories with no rights over his own body, which is degraded to a tool, under the worst conditions imaginable. Being disintegrated, he or she is integrated into the logic of exploitation of neoliberal economies and national politics.

Does this person, with whom the “universal subject,” who is free to travel the world, shares so little (believes he shares so little and is willing to share so little) show us the meaning of sociality? The person who, with a history of centuries of subjugation, has internalised the fact that the exploitation of natural resources and the destruction of social structures in favour of the greatest possible accumulation of capital are ruinous concepts, producing a crisis that does not permit differentiation—for instance between human and human, between human and nature, between animate and inanimate existence, hunter and hunted—a crisis that knows no outside no way back?

“Fugitivity” is described by Gordon as a movement that transcends social, political, geographical boundaries, away from what discrim-

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Avery F. Gordon’s presentation “Migration—Talking Migration” on the occasion of *100 Years of Now* on 24 March 2017 at the Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin (<https://www.hkw.de/en/app/mediathek/video/55799>).

inates against us, subjugates us and disciplines us, towards something else, something better that does not yet exist. A movement that became the “epistemology or ontology of black resistance” in the US context. The movements of slaves in flight, leaving plantations, workshops, households and quarters behind them in the course of the American Civil War, are preceded by “the first great movement of commodities, the ones that could speak.”<sup>14</sup> A violent act of “primitive accumulation” that forcibly removes people from their attachment to the land they inhabit, from their social environment and at the same time from their subjectivity, in order to deal with them as though they were goods. An extreme form of appropriation that disciplines them in continually different ways and turns them into “inappropriate(d) others,”<sup>15</sup> defines them as objects belonging to someone other than themselves, and finally deprives them of the right and “capacity to see or recognise reality.”<sup>16</sup>

The person who never moves alone, says Gordon, is a “fugitive from the law, fugitive from the nation state, fugitive from the whole political order that structures markets for labor and structures politics of national governance through citizenship.”<sup>17</sup> Then as now, his movement manifests itself in moments of refusal, emancipation and self-determination.

6  
The knowledge of the ruinous circumstances caused by the “universal subject” of modernity along with globalised capital through the plundering of natural, social and ideational resources is neither a secret, nor is it new. And as long as this knowledge is not activated, its bearers, who behave passively in face of these conditions, perpetuating them or enduring them without contradiction, are accomplices to the plundering.

But how can this knowledge be activated? Perhaps through the figure of the witness, who embodies committed perception and presence in the sense of “being-with”? For André Lepecki, the aesthetic and political quality of testimony lies in the “active relation to the future historicity of the event.”<sup>18</sup> It would seem even more urgent

14 Stefano Harney, Fred Moten, *The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study*, Wivenhoe / New York / Port Watson: Minor Compositions, 2013, p. 92.

15 “Inappropriate/d Artificiality,” Trinh T. Minh-ha in conversation with Marina Gržinić, 2 June 1998 (<http://trinhminh-ha.squarespace.com/inappropriated->

artificiality/).

16 bell hooks, *Belonging: A Culture of Place*, New York / London: Routledge, 2009, p. 93.

17 Avery F. Gordon, “Migration—Talking Migration.”

18 André Lepecki, *Singularities: Dance in the Age of Performance*, New York / London: Routledge, 2016, p. 180.

to reveal the full impact of the continuity and complexity of the “event,” the plundering, and to make it more understandable, more palpable. For example through the concept of “elsewhere within here” (Trinh T. Minh-ha), meant neither in a purely temporal nor in a purely spatial sense, which repeatedly recognises the ecological, social, cultural, economic and political connections of the plundering and demands that these connections be actively challenged.

At the same time, the historicity inherent in witnessing (in the sense of producing history and narratives) is of great importance. To paraphrase Walter Benjamin, the witness only becomes a witness when he communicates to others what he has seen and experienced. So it is not primarily a matter of objectifiable information, but rather of embedding it in the life of the witness, from whom the narrative can grow as an experience that can be shared.<sup>19</sup> In this way it is not the witness or the narrator who is immortal, but “the very story of repetition, a story that, repeated at least twice, is not individual.”<sup>20</sup>

7  
“MOST of them accepted namelessness with the perfect indifference with which they had so long accepted and ignored their names,” begins Ursula Le Guin’s short story *She Unnames Them*, in which Eve frees all beings of creation, one after another, of their names. “NONE were left now to unname, and yet, how close I felt to them when I saw one of them swim or fly or trot or crawl across my way or over my skin, or stalk me in the night, or go along beside me for a while in the day,” she says a little later. “They seemed far closer than when their names had stood between myself and them like a clear barrier: so close that my fear of them and their fear of me became one same fear.”<sup>21</sup>

On the threshold of “hope” and “fear,” between that which is not quite itself, but also not something other, where fear is clearly not *existentially* the selfsame fear, but the fear of all, resistance and joy is shareable. On this very threshold, a radical form of hospitality is conceivable, renouncing the role of the “eternal host” (who, acting on an impulse of well-meaning humanism, invites everyone and

19 Cf. Walter Benjamin, “Der Erzähler. Betrachtungen zum Werk Nikolai Lesskows” (1936), published in: *Walter Benjamin: Essays and Reflections*, ed. Hannah Arendt, New York: Schocken, 1968.

20 Shoshana Felman, *The Juridical Unconscious: trials and traumas in the twentieth century*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 52.


21 Ursula K. Le Guin, “She Unnames Them,” in: *The New Yorker*, 21 January 1985, p. 27.

speaks for everyone and then tells his guests where to sit and how to behave). This hospitality would stand for a direct connectedness in which there are—in Roland Barthes' words—"only direct addresses, presences, not images, absences."<sup>22</sup> It would be an invitation to exchange traditional and internalised aesthetic concepts of the not so "universal" subject for experiences of "being in common" and "becoming with," in order to interpret seeing, hearing, speaking in continually new ways. The gathering, at which everyone would be guests and hosts at the same time, would be an unrestrainedly joyful event—remaining silent, listening, shouting, dancing, howling together—an expression of mutual responsibility. To use the words of bell hooks, the aesthetic would then be "more than a philosophy or theory of art and beauty; it is a way of inhabiting space, a particular location, a way of looking and becoming."<sup>23</sup>

This kind of aesthetic possesses the socio-poetic power of transformation.

<sup>22</sup> Barthes, Lecture at the Collège de France, Session March 30, 1977, in: *How to Live Together*, p. 101. <sup>23</sup> hooks, p. 122.

# (IL)LEGALLY SURVIVING











IUVENTA

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